By simply creating smoking and nonsmoking sections, the legislators ignored the third conclusion of the report: The simple separation of smokers and nonsmokers within the same airspace may reduce, but would not eliminate, exposure to secondhand smoke.By including ventilation as a method to “minimize the toxic effect of smoke in the adjacent nonsmoking areas,” the bill was supporting tobacco industry strategy to combat the strong reduction in cigarette consumption created by 100% smoke free areas.Since at least the issuance of the 1986 Surgeon General’s report, the tobacco industry invested considerable resources to develop and disseminate its “ventilation solution” despite the fact that the levels of ventilation required to control the health risks of SHS were economically unfeasible.Despite these limitations, HB 430 and SB 130 were relatively strong clean indoor air laws for the time, particularly considering that Virginia was a tobacco-producing state, and would have provided substantial protection for many Virginians .The other three were extremely limited bills, covering a small number of public places, and not addressing retail establishments, healthcare facilities, or workplaces.Nationwide, other laws considered or approved around the same time were similar to or weaker than the proposed language of HB 430 and SB 130. Iowa’s House File 79 in 1987, which amended the existing 1978 clean indoor air law, exempted all restaurants and private workplaces and carried a meager $10 fine for violation.However, it resembled the proposed Virginia bills in prohibiting smoking in other areas. Although initially determining that they did not want to actively support the Michie and Cohen bills, Kevin Cooper helped convince the Tri-Agency Council to undertake a large and visible campaign,cannabis indoor grow system including letter-writing to legislators and bussing in supporters, to promote the passage of SB 130 and HB 430.
The Tri-Agency Council also commissioned an independent poll that showed that 66% of Virginians favored smoking restrictions in public areas.The support of the large voluntary health organizations was an important component of Cohen and Michie’s advocacy for the VICAA; they pointed to that support when arguing the merits of SB 130 and HB 430 during the 1988 session.This did not mean that the Tri-Agency Council and GASP had a harmonious relationship. As mentioned above, the Tri-Agency Council was formed in part to distance the ALA, ACS, andAHA from GASP’s “radical” positions on tobacco control legislation. However, the Tri-Agency Council’s support was an important part of Cohen and Michie’s legislative strategy.As introduced, HB 430 and SB 130 did not preempt local ordinances, which continued to make the possibility of strong local legislation a significant future threat to the industry. The tobacco industry has utilized preemption to block local ordinances, which are harder for the industry to oppose and often stronger than state laws, because of the industry’s greater power in state legislatures than at the local level. As Victor Crawford, a former Tobacco Institute lobbyist, described the nationwide situation in 1995, “We could never win at the local level … so the Tobacco Institute and tobacco companies’ first priority has always been to preempt the field … because the health advocates can’t compete with me on a state level.”By February the tobacco industry was gathering opposition forces. Several influential Virginia legislators were strong supporters of the tobacco industry. Del. A.L. Philpott , a longtime pipe smoker fond of smoking during house debates and who was at one point embroiled in a controversy for smoking on camera while Governor L. Douglas Wilder spoke,served as the Speaker of the House from 1957 until his death in 1991. Philpott was a strong ally of the tobacco industry and opposed tobacco control bills until his death.
He had received between $300-$500 in campaign contributions per election cycle alone from the Tobacco Institute between 1982 and 1989, when the average Tobacco Institute contribution was $100 per election cycle.The industry wished to make a strong show of opposition, with several companies and affiliated trade and hospitality groups planning to attend a joint hearing of the General Assembly on February 4 in order to make their presence felt.Other groups sympathizing with the tobacco industry also voiced their displeasure. For example, Harry G. Daniel, a former Philip Morris researcher and a member of the Board of Supervisors of Chesterfield County, reported to Philip Morris that the Virginia Association of Counties’ Executive Boards had voted not to support Cohen’s bill. Daniel also was one of many individuals who sounded the tobacco industry’s alarm bells by noting that “[f]or those who do not know Delegate Cohen and his persistence, we can speculate that this type of legislature [sic] will be introduced year end [sic] and year out until he has sufficient votes for passage.”In February, attempts were made to introduce amendments in the nature of substitutes to both SB 130 and HB 430. On February 11, the Senate Education and Health Committee rejected two substitute proposals for SB 130, both intended to broaden the scope of the proposed law.The first would have allowed counties to adopt broad smoking restrictions; the second would have strengthened the requirement no-smoking areas in restaurants and food stores. Both substitutes were rejected.Sen. Michie then requested that the bill be held over to the 1989 session in original form.Bills were often held over when a bill’s sponsor felt that the votes were insufficient for passage, when a sponsor felt there was not enough time to negotiate all the details with other legislators, or when the sponsor felt that he or she could not prevent an unwanted amendment. Occasionally, a bill would be held over by a hostile committee in the hopes that it would be withdrawn before the next session.HB 430 was amended in the House Committee on Health, Welfare, and Institutions, reducing the scope of the bill to completely prohibit smoking in only elevators, polling rooms, school buses and hospital emergency rooms.It also required no-smoking areas in a limited number of places: public buildings, grocery stores larger than 20,000 square feet, and jury deliberation rooms.
Unlike the bill as introduced, it did not mention or cover bars, restaurants or public transit.108 In contrast to the original bill, there was no mention of penalties or any provision for enforcement. After the substitute, the bill was reported by the Health, Welfare and Institutions Committee and considered by the House General Laws Committee, which held the bill over to the 1989 session by a 11-7 vote.Despite the fact that neither bill passed, the tobacco industry was concerned that the survival of the bill into the 1989 session would lead to more exposure for both the bill and health advocates’ agendas. In August 1988 the Tobacco Institute decided to plan strategically for the opposition in the upcoming session and meetings were held that month to discuss the potential for pro-tobacco grassroots activities and to coordinate their legislative plans. The Tobacco Institute created the Virginia Tobacco Coalition to implement these goals.Part of the “Virginia Pro-Active Program,” a TI-facilitated initative to use preemptive legislation to promote tobacco industry policy goals,heavy duty racking system these meetings included grower, farmer, trade, and hospitality groups in addition to the industry stalwarts and lobbyists. Specifically, the groups included the Tobacco Institute, Philip Morris, RJR, Universal Leaf Tobacco, Virginia Wholesalers and Distributors, Farm Bureau, Hospitality Association and American Tobacco.They continued their meetings through October and into 1989 and a unanimous consensus began to emerge that preemptive legislation would be the best way to combat the “highly visible”campaign by GASP and the voluntary health organizations to pass the VICAA. The VTC determined that they should also introduce legislation “aimed at reducing discrimination against smokers” with the goal of forcing “the combined anti-tobacco forces to defend rather than attack and make the defeat of carryover and any new restrictive smoking legislation an easier task.”The specifics of the VTC plan illustrate the extent to which the industry could influence Virginia politics by taking advantage of the committee structure in the General Assembly in order to advance favorable bills and shuffle unfavorable bills to hostile committees. The Speaker of the House and President of the Senate were both considered by the tobacco industry and health advocates to be friendly to tobacco interests, and as in most legislatures, they had the power to assign bills to specific committees. When introducing legislation, the tobacco industry’s plan was to confer with the two legislative leaders about which committee the bill should be referred to so the industry could lobby the relevant committee chairpersons, with the intention of yielding the most favorable outcome from the industry’s point of view.In addition to directly lobbying the General Assembly, the VTC employed a tactic of using petition and letter-writing campaigns coordinated with local pro-tobacco groups to put external pressure on legislators.Philip Morris typified the response, realizing that their Government Affairs Division needed petition signatures to combat the notion that the clean indoor air law was popular among Virginians. Some petitions were circulated at the 1988 Virginia State Fair through the Philip Morris booth and a Philip Morris internal memo reveals a request for signatures from employees and their families and friends.
Virginia GASP reported that several constituents had received pre-written letters from Philip Morris opposing the bill, and simply signed them and sent them to their legislators.The reality on the ground was that the grassroots anti-smoking movements were gaining support. The industry attempted to stem a feeling of inevitability that smoking restrictions would pass by mobilizing opposition forces that appeared distinct from the industry itself. Doing so is a common industry tactic to attempt to mitigate the effect of the industry’s lack of credibility with the public.Significant momentum was building in Virginia towards a statewide clean indoor air bill after the 1988 session ended. Starting in 1988 and extending into the 1989 session, GASP presented the General Assembly with petitions including over 7,000 signatures calling on lawmakers to “restrict public smoking in enclosed buildings and public conveyances.”110 GASP recruited a large number of groups to support their position by the time SB 130 and HB 430 were reconsidered in the 1989 session, including the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation, Virginia State Parent Teachers Association, Richmond Academy of Medicine, Virginia Pediatric Society, Virginia Society of Respiratory Therapists, Virginia Thoracic Society, Auxiliary to the Rockingham County Medical Society, Virginia Affiliate of the National Foundation for the Chemically Hypersensitive, Virginia Inter agency Council on Tobacco OR Health, and the Virginia affiliates of the American Lung Association, American Heart Association, and American Cancer Society.The three Virginia chapters of the national voluntary health organizations also initiated legislative outreach programs, offering educational pamphlets to legislators and the public, and distributing pre-printed postcards with anti-smoking messages to send to legislators.In response, the VTC circulated their own petition opposing statewide clean indoor air laws. The text of the petition read: “YES, I favor voluntary determination regarding smoking indoors rather than government mandates on where and when you may smoke and not smoke.”GASP reported that the VTC petition campaign netted 30,000 signatures by the 1989 session.The VTC’s members also spoke out against the bill, creating significant press coverage of the issue. The head of the Virginia Farm Bureau Federation, for example, stated to the Richmond Times-Dispatch that “[t]obacco legislation threatens to run farmers out of business … In other words, there should be no mandates on smoking.”Tobacco industry lobbying and legislator outreach campaigns killed both HB 430 and SB 130 in late January 1989, despite the broad grassroots support for the smoking restrictions.HB 430 was held in the House General Laws Committee by a vote of 10-8, effectively killing it.SB 130 was considered again in the Senate Education and Health Committee, and reported out of committee, but subsequently failed on the Senate floor during the second reading by a close vote of 19-20.The death of both bills was likely due in part to the actions of the VTC and other notable influences, especially the actions of the influential Anthony Troy, who served as the Tobacco Institute’s lobbyist in Virginia from at least 1988 until the Tobacco Institute dissolved in 1998. Soon afterwards, Senator Michie introduced SB 805, which was almost identical to SB 130.SB 805 died after it was ruled out of order by the Senate because it duplicated language of a bill that had been rejected by the full Senate.