The VBRA would go on to play a significant role in subsequent legislative sessions

Steve Yeakel, Representing Montana Council for Maternal and Child Health, said that he supported committing $3.2 million a year for tobacco prevention as was proposed in SB 485 , and supported an 18 cent tobacco tax increase. However, because some county health departments might lose funding for mental health medications and some individuals might lose medicaid services, he could not support more than $3.2 million for tobacco prevention.In response, HB 756 sponsor, Rep. Kaufman, stated that she believed the Legislature could find other funding sources for human services programs, without using tobacco settlement dollars.The chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, Sen. Dave Lewis , gave the bill lukewarm support at the March 25, 2003 hearing. Lewis told tobacco prevention activists that he would try to grant their wish for $9.3 million for prevention programs, but warned that less money would therefore go to human service programs for the needy.Lewis further stated that “I’m tired of getting beat over the head,” and that “I’ll vote for this, but we got to come up with the money somewhere else.” Rep. Lewis did vote in favor of HB 756, which was passed by the House Appropriations Committee on March 26, 2003 by a voter of 13 to 6.235 It would next have to be voted on by the full House. As conveyed by Rep. Lewis’ comments,vertical grow system the House Committee’s support of HB 756 resulted largely from the health advocates’ pressure on the Legislature. According to the Billings Gazette, “[t]obacco prevention lobbysist lined the Capitol’s halls and packed hearing rooms to support keeping the voter-approved funding formula intact.”In the same article, Rep.

Lewis said that the health advocates that “[t]hey won fair and square.”On March 28, 2003, the full House approved HB 756 by a vote of 59 to 38. Local newspapers, however, reported that many lawmakers were still critical of the bill’s passage, arguing that the money should be available for other programs, because the human services budget was underfunded. HB 756 sponsor Rep. Kaufman responded in news reports that she was confident that the Legislature would find other sources of money to adequately fund human services programs.Kaufman stated that “[i]n the coming weeks, we have many opportunities to find revenue… And we will.” There were only 3 individuals testifying against SB 485, and they only gave very mild opposition to the “temporary diversion” of MSA money that was proposed. Joe Mazurek, representing PMK, opposed the bill, but also stated that the groups recognized the state’s budget predicament and were willing to take less than the full amount that the voters approved. Mazurek ended his testimony by saying he hoped that the tobacco prevention would get fully funded by the 2005 biennium. Verner Bertelsen, representing Montana Senior Citizen’s Association, stated that he was reluctant to testify against SB 485, and also hoped that tobacco prevention would be fully funded in the long run. Finally, Sammy Butler, representing the Montana Nurses Association, after commending Sen. Cobb for his commitment to fund human services programs, stated that his organization felt an obligation to respect the will of the voters, and that they reluctantly opposed SB 485. The Senate Finance and Claims Committee unanimously approved SB 485, 19 to 0, on April 1, 2003. The bill then went before the full Senate, which passed the bill by vote of 43 to 6 on April 14, 2003. SB 485 would next be transferred to the House, where it would be referred to House Committee on Business and Labor.At the April 16 hearing on SB 485 before the House Committee on Business and Labor, proponent testimony was given by representatives from 4 human services groups, including Jim Ahrens of the Montana Hospital Association.

Testimony in opposition to SB 485 was again presented by Joe Mazurek of PMK and Sammy Butler of the Montana Nurses Association. The House Committee on Business and Labor approved SB 485 by 14 to 4 on April 16, 2003. The full House approved SB 485 in a 60 to 40 vote on April 23, 2003.246 According to the Associated Press, none of the House members commenting on the passage of the bill by the full house argued against the need for funding of human services programs. Instead, House members against SB 485 focused their criticisms on respecting the will of the voters expressed in I-146, and the lack of a long term solution to the state’s budget problems.With the acquiescence from the very health groups that campaigned to get I-146 approved by voters, SB 485 passed with no trouble, and almost $11.8 million was diverted away from tobacco prevention in the 2004-2005 biennium. So by the end of April 2003, voter approved I-146 was virtually voided for two years. Thus, tobacco use prevention programs was allocated $3.2 million annually for the 2004-2005 biennium, as opposed to the $9 million annually specified under I-146 . Furthermore, the amount actually allocated to the TUPP in 2005 was lowered to $2.5 million per year after reduction adjustments to the state’s MSA payment . The state also appointed 15 people as a Tobacco Prevention Advisory Board in July of 2003 as was mandated by I-146, which would advise the DPHHS on how to allocate MSA money and play a similar role as the disbanded Governor’s Advisory Council on Tobacco Use Prevention .The $220 million budget deficit projected for the 2004-2005 biennium not only provided a justification for diversion of MSA funds to other human services programs, but also affected the 2003 Legislature’s consideration of increased tobacco taxes.Several tobacco tax increases were proposed in the 2003 Legislature, though only one would actually pass, Senate Bill 407. Even SB 407, however, would have probably failed if state legislators were less desperate to find additional state revenue. In the opinion of the major health groups , “had the state’s budget crisis not existed, a tobacco tax increase would not likely have passed.

Most legislators were clearly motivated simply by the need for additional revenue generated by the tobacco tax increase.”In addition to the state’s projected budget deficit, a survey of 405 Montana voters sponsored by Protect Montana Kids.org conducted in June 2003 by Harstad Strategic Research showed that tobacco taxes were a popular source of health care funding. The survey showed that 66% of those surveyed favored increasing tobacco taxes by 50 cents per pack if the revenues were directed to Montana health care services.As a result of the lack of funding for government services in 2003 and the public popularity of tobacco taxes as a source of health care funding, a tobacco tax increase was a popular option of revenue,indoor grow shelves despite what health advocated called a “reluctance on the part of some members of the legislature to increase tobacco taxes at all…”Several tobacco taxes were proposed by both Republicans and Democrats, though all of them except for SB 407 failed . Throughout the failed attempts to increase the cigarette tax, tobacco control groups gave consistent support to the proposed bills, while tobacco industry lobbyists consistently argued against them.The tobacco tax in Montana had not been permanently increased since 1990, when it was raised from 16 cents to 18 cents per pack. Former Gov. Marc Racicot in 2000 had included a cigarette tax increase of 38 cents a pack in his final budget recommendation before leaving office, but Gov. Judy Martz, who signed a no-new taxes pledge during her campaign, rejected the proposal.Tobacco control advocates had been promoting the idea of increased tobacco taxes throughout 2002 and 2003 as a way to raise funds for state programs and reduce tobacco use. In an April 30, 2002 opinion letter to the Helena Independent Record, Kristin Page Nei of ACS, Cliff Christian of AHA, and Dick Paulsen of ALA, wrote that “[t]he debate about tobacco taxes has recently heated up,”and noted that Montana in 2002 had the 11th lowest cigarette tax in the nation. The letter also explained the health costs in Montana resulting from smoke-related illness, and the potential for an increased cigarette tax to raise revenue for healthcare programs and deter children from smoking.The major health groups and other tobacco control advocates would continue to make statements in news articles as the debate over cigarette taxes became a greater focus in local newspapers. Tobacco control advocates also showed the popularity of the tobacco tax among Montana voters to state legislators. A Harstead Strategic Research Poll conducted between November 20-25 and paid for by health groups in Protect MontanaKids.org showed that, of 602 registered voters, 69% supported raising the per pack cigarette tax from 18 cents to $1.50 for the purpose of funding health programs, 27% were opposed to the increased tax, and 3% were undecided .

The poll was released on December 11, 2002, less than a month before the 2003 Legislature was to convene.Health groups and tobacco control advocates showed support for the failed cigarette tax proposals introduced throughout the 2003 Legislature . At a January 27, 2003 House Taxation Committee hearing where HB 204, HB 355 and HB 314 were presented, supporting testimony for cigarette taxes was given by 34 people, many of them representing health groups. Many of those same individuals and health groups also testified in favor of the SB 309 at the February 6, 2003 hearing before the Senate Taxation Committee,in support of SB 351 at the February 14, 2003 Senate Taxation Committee hearing,and in support of HB 763 at the March 31, 2003 House Taxation Committee Hearing.When the idea of increasing cigarette taxes began to be reported in local newspapers as an option that legislators were willing to consider, the tobacco industry began to criticize the idea. John Singleton, a spokesman for R.J. Reynolds, told the Billings Gazette that “[i]t’s a relatively small slice of the population to be paying for health care, budget deficit reduction, whatever they’re going to use the money for.”Singleton also stated that “[e]xcise taxes are already pretty high, and these various states are collecting quite a lot of revenue from the tobacco companies as it is.”The argument that the tobacco industry and smokers were paying an unfair share of taxes would be continued throughout the legislative session. Tobacco industry lobbyists opposed the failed cigarette tax proposals throughout the 2003 Legislative session. R.J. Reynolds lobbyist Jerome Anderson, in giving opposing testimony to HB 204, HB 355 and HB 314 at the January 27, 2003 House Taxation Committee hearing, stated that HB 204 would increase the state cigarette tax by 833%, and that HB 355 and HB 314 would amount to the highest tax increases he had seen in 56 years of Legislative sessions.265 Anderson added that smokers already pay their fair share and, though he agreed that Montanan needed help with health insurance and prescription drugs, he thought “those responsibilities are the responsibilities of everyone in Montana and not just a selective few.”265 Reflecting standard tobacco industry rhetoric, Anderson also suggested that large cigarette tax increases would lead to smuggling cigarettes from states with cheaper taxes or buying over the internet without proper security against sales to minors.265 Jerome Anderson and other tobacco industry representatives repeated these arguments when testifying against SB 309 at the February 6, 2003 Senate Taxation Committee hearing,258 against SB 351 at the February 14, 2003 Senate Taxation Committee hearing,259 and against HB 763 at the March 31, 2003 Taxation Committee Hearing.260. Along with Jerome Anderson, Aimee Grmoljez, an attorney with the firm Browing, Kaleczyc, Berry & Hoven , testified as a representative of Phillip Morris against the cigarette tax proposals, as did Mark Baker, representing U.S. Smokeless Tobacco and Mark Staples, representing Montana Wholesale Distributors.Governor Martz, as late as March 2003, was standing firm to her pledge not to raise new taxes, and stated specifically that her promise to veto tax increases included any cigarette taxes.Even in the face of a reported $232 million budget deficit, and with no solution to funding human services programs, Gov. Martz told reporters that she could not support the idea of paying the state’s bills by raising “sin” taxes.Although Gov. Martz did indicate a willingness to compromise her tax veto promise in support of proposed HB 750, which proposed violating the state’s coal tax trust fund and would therefore not gain enough votes because Democrats were unwilling to violate the trust.However, because the budget deficit in March 2003 was beginning to look unsolvable, Republican legislators became less opposed to raising tobacco taxes.

Holding over a bill was common in Virginia due to the very short legislative session

By simply creating smoking and nonsmoking sections, the legislators ignored the third conclusion of the report: The simple separation of smokers and nonsmokers within the same airspace may reduce, but would not eliminate, exposure to secondhand smoke.By including ventilation as a method to “minimize the toxic effect of smoke in the adjacent nonsmoking areas,” the bill was supporting tobacco industry strategy to combat the strong reduction in cigarette consumption created by 100% smoke free areas.Since at least the issuance of the 1986 Surgeon General’s report, the tobacco industry invested considerable resources to develop and disseminate its “ventilation solution” despite the fact that the levels of ventilation required to control the health risks of SHS were economically unfeasible.Despite these limitations, HB 430 and SB 130 were relatively strong clean indoor air laws for the time, particularly considering that Virginia was a tobacco-producing state, and would have provided substantial protection for many Virginians .The other three were extremely limited bills, covering a small number of public places, and not addressing retail establishments, healthcare facilities, or workplaces.Nationwide, other laws considered or approved around the same time were similar to or weaker than the proposed language of HB 430 and SB 130. Iowa’s House File 79 in 1987, which amended the existing 1978 clean indoor air law, exempted all restaurants and private workplaces and carried a meager $10 fine for violation.However, it resembled the proposed Virginia bills in prohibiting smoking in other areas. Although initially determining that they did not want to actively support the Michie and Cohen bills, Kevin Cooper helped convince the Tri-Agency Council to undertake a large and visible campaign,cannabis indoor grow system including letter-writing to legislators and bussing in supporters, to promote the passage of SB 130 and HB 430.

The Tri-Agency Council also commissioned an independent poll that showed that 66% of Virginians favored smoking restrictions in public areas.The support of the large voluntary health organizations was an important component of Cohen and Michie’s advocacy for the VICAA; they pointed to that support when arguing the merits of SB 130 and HB 430 during the 1988 session.This did not mean that the Tri-Agency Council and GASP had a harmonious relationship. As mentioned above, the Tri-Agency Council was formed in part to distance the ALA, ACS, andAHA from GASP’s “radical” positions on tobacco control legislation. However, the Tri-Agency Council’s support was an important part of Cohen and Michie’s legislative strategy.As introduced, HB 430 and SB 130 did not preempt local ordinances, which continued to make the possibility of strong local legislation a significant future threat to the industry. The tobacco industry has utilized preemption to block local ordinances, which are harder for the industry to oppose and often stronger than state laws, because of the industry’s greater power in state legislatures than at the local level. As Victor Crawford, a former Tobacco Institute lobbyist, described the nationwide situation in 1995, “We could never win at the local level … so the Tobacco Institute and tobacco companies’ first priority has always been to preempt the field … because the health advocates can’t compete with me on a state level.”By February the tobacco industry was gathering opposition forces. Several influential Virginia legislators were strong supporters of the tobacco industry. Del. A.L. Philpott , a longtime pipe smoker fond of smoking during house debates and who was at one point embroiled in a controversy for smoking on camera while Governor L. Douglas Wilder spoke,served as the Speaker of the House from 1957 until his death in 1991. Philpott was a strong ally of the tobacco industry and opposed tobacco control bills until his death.

He had received between $300-$500 in campaign contributions per election cycle alone from the Tobacco Institute between 1982 and 1989, when the average Tobacco Institute contribution was $100 per election cycle.The industry wished to make a strong show of opposition, with several companies and affiliated trade and hospitality groups planning to attend a joint hearing of the General Assembly on February 4 in order to make their presence felt.Other groups sympathizing with the tobacco industry also voiced their displeasure. For example, Harry G. Daniel, a former Philip Morris researcher and a member of the Board of Supervisors of Chesterfield County, reported to Philip Morris that the Virginia Association of Counties’ Executive Boards had voted not to support Cohen’s bill. Daniel also was one of many individuals who sounded the tobacco industry’s alarm bells by noting that “[f]or those who do not know Delegate Cohen and his persistence, we can speculate that this type of legislature [sic] will be introduced year end [sic] and year out until he has sufficient votes for passage.”In February, attempts were made to introduce amendments in the nature of substitutes to both SB 130 and HB 430. On February 11, the Senate Education and Health Committee rejected two substitute proposals for SB 130, both intended to broaden the scope of the proposed law.The first would have allowed counties to adopt broad smoking restrictions; the second would have strengthened the requirement no-smoking areas in restaurants and food stores. Both substitutes were rejected.Sen. Michie then requested that the bill be held over to the 1989 session in original form.Bills were often held over when a bill’s sponsor felt that the votes were insufficient for passage, when a sponsor felt there was not enough time to negotiate all the details with other legislators, or when the sponsor felt that he or she could not prevent an unwanted amendment. Occasionally, a bill would be held over by a hostile committee in the hopes that it would be withdrawn before the next session.HB 430 was amended in the House Committee on Health, Welfare, and Institutions, reducing the scope of the bill to completely prohibit smoking in only elevators, polling rooms, school buses and hospital emergency rooms.It also required no-smoking areas in a limited number of places: public buildings, grocery stores larger than 20,000 square feet, and jury deliberation rooms.

Unlike the bill as introduced, it did not mention or cover bars, restaurants or public transit.108 In contrast to the original bill, there was no mention of penalties or any provision for enforcement. After the substitute, the bill was reported by the Health, Welfare and Institutions Committee and considered by the House General Laws Committee, which held the bill over to the 1989 session by a 11-7 vote.Despite the fact that neither bill passed, the tobacco industry was concerned that the survival of the bill into the 1989 session would lead to more exposure for both the bill and health advocates’ agendas. In August 1988 the Tobacco Institute decided to plan strategically for the opposition in the upcoming session and meetings were held that month to discuss the potential for pro-tobacco grassroots activities and to coordinate their legislative plans. The Tobacco Institute created the Virginia Tobacco Coalition to implement these goals.Part of the “Virginia Pro-Active Program,” a TI-facilitated initative to use preemptive legislation to promote tobacco industry policy goals,heavy duty racking system these meetings included grower, farmer, trade, and hospitality groups in addition to the industry stalwarts and lobbyists. Specifically, the groups included the Tobacco Institute, Philip Morris, RJR, Universal Leaf Tobacco, Virginia Wholesalers and Distributors, Farm Bureau, Hospitality Association and American Tobacco.They continued their meetings through October and into 1989 and a unanimous consensus began to emerge that preemptive legislation would be the best way to combat the “highly visible”campaign by GASP and the voluntary health organizations to pass the VICAA. The VTC determined that they should also introduce legislation “aimed at reducing discrimination against smokers” with the goal of forcing “the combined anti-tobacco forces to defend rather than attack and make the defeat of carryover and any new restrictive smoking legislation an easier task.”The specifics of the VTC plan illustrate the extent to which the industry could influence Virginia politics by taking advantage of the committee structure in the General Assembly in order to advance favorable bills and shuffle unfavorable bills to hostile committees. The Speaker of the House and President of the Senate were both considered by the tobacco industry and health advocates to be friendly to tobacco interests, and as in most legislatures, they had the power to assign bills to specific committees. When introducing legislation, the tobacco industry’s plan was to confer with the two legislative leaders about which committee the bill should be referred to so the industry could lobby the relevant committee chairpersons, with the intention of yielding the most favorable outcome from the industry’s point of view.In addition to directly lobbying the General Assembly, the VTC employed a tactic of using petition and letter-writing campaigns coordinated with local pro-tobacco groups to put external pressure on legislators.Philip Morris typified the response, realizing that their Government Affairs Division needed petition signatures to combat the notion that the clean indoor air law was popular among Virginians. Some petitions were circulated at the 1988 Virginia State Fair through the Philip Morris booth and a Philip Morris internal memo reveals a request for signatures from employees and their families and friends.

Virginia GASP reported that several constituents had received pre-written letters from Philip Morris opposing the bill, and simply signed them and sent them to their legislators.The reality on the ground was that the grassroots anti-smoking movements were gaining support. The industry attempted to stem a feeling of inevitability that smoking restrictions would pass by mobilizing opposition forces that appeared distinct from the industry itself. Doing so is a common industry tactic to attempt to mitigate the effect of the industry’s lack of credibility with the public.Significant momentum was building in Virginia towards a statewide clean indoor air bill after the 1988 session ended. Starting in 1988 and extending into the 1989 session, GASP presented the General Assembly with petitions including over 7,000 signatures calling on lawmakers to “restrict public smoking in enclosed buildings and public conveyances.”110 GASP recruited a large number of groups to support their position by the time SB 130 and HB 430 were reconsidered in the 1989 session, including the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation, Virginia State Parent Teachers Association, Richmond Academy of Medicine, Virginia Pediatric Society, Virginia Society of Respiratory Therapists, Virginia Thoracic Society, Auxiliary to the Rockingham County Medical Society, Virginia Affiliate of the National Foundation for the Chemically Hypersensitive, Virginia Inter agency Council on Tobacco OR Health, and the Virginia affiliates of the American Lung Association, American Heart Association, and American Cancer Society.The three Virginia chapters of the national voluntary health organizations also initiated legislative outreach programs, offering educational pamphlets to legislators and the public, and distributing pre-printed postcards with anti-smoking messages to send to legislators.In response, the VTC circulated their own petition opposing statewide clean indoor air laws. The text of the petition read: “YES, I favor voluntary determination regarding smoking indoors rather than government mandates on where and when you may smoke and not smoke.”GASP reported that the VTC petition campaign netted 30,000 signatures by the 1989 session.The VTC’s members also spoke out against the bill, creating significant press coverage of the issue. The head of the Virginia Farm Bureau Federation, for example, stated to the Richmond Times-Dispatch that “[t]obacco legislation threatens to run farmers out of business … In other words, there should be no mandates on smoking.”Tobacco industry lobbying and legislator outreach campaigns killed both HB 430 and SB 130 in late January 1989, despite the broad grassroots support for the smoking restrictions.HB 430 was held in the House General Laws Committee by a vote of 10-8, effectively killing it.SB 130 was considered again in the Senate Education and Health Committee, and reported out of committee, but subsequently failed on the Senate floor during the second reading by a close vote of 19-20.The death of both bills was likely due in part to the actions of the VTC and other notable influences, especially the actions of the influential Anthony Troy, who served as the Tobacco Institute’s lobbyist in Virginia from at least 1988 until the Tobacco Institute dissolved in 1998. Soon afterwards, Senator Michie introduced SB 805, which was almost identical to SB 130.SB 805 died after it was ruled out of order by the Senate because it duplicated language of a bill that had been rejected by the full Senate.

Cities may be granted express powers after the initial grant of a charter by the General Assembly

Founded as Jamestown Colony in 1607 by members of the Virginia Company, the early years of colonization were extremely difficult. The introduction of tobacco cultivation and export by John Rolfe around 1613, inspired by native cultivation, gave the nascent colony a stable income. Rolfe’s contributions allowed the colony to survive because tobacco was the only cash crop grown in the colony at that time. As the colony grew and the capital moved to Williamsburg in 1699, Jamestown diminished in importance, but tobacco remained an important crop throughout the colonial period and the early history of the United States. However, while in recent years tobacco growing in Virginia has diminished and become of minor importance to the state economy, tobacco growing remains a powerful rhetorical tool of the tobacco industry to fight tobacco control efforts. In the U.S., residents of tobacco-growing states suffer from higher smoking-attributable mortality rates, and other serious health consequences due to higher rates of tobacco use. These consequences are significant; in a tobacco-growing state, 320 deaths per 100,000 are due to smoking-attributable causes, compared to 278 per 100,000 in non-tobacco-growing states.1 Tobacco-growing states also face greater difficulty promoting tobacco control policies.On average, tobacco-growing states have half the per capita funding available for tobacco control, one-third of the tobacco excise tax rates, and only one-tenth the population covered by clean indoor air and youth access laws.1 As a tobacco-growing state with a significant tobacco manufacturing presence and tobacco lobbying effort, health advocates in Virginia has had great difficulty promoting tobacco control policies. However, changing demographics, particularly in suburban Northern Virginia, and consistently strong public support for stronger clean indoor air laws and increased cigarette excise taxes,mobile rack show that Virginia has the opportunity to move beyond its past and protect its citizens from the health dangers of tobacco use and secondhand smoke.

Tobacco use is the leading preventable cause of death in Virginia, causing more than 9,200 lives each year.The healthcare costs resulting from tobacco use cost the state $1.92 billion annually in health care bills, including $369 million in Medicaid payments alone.Adult smoking prevalence in Virginia has been similar to, or even a little below, the United States as a whole . From 2002-2005, smoking prevalence declined both nationally and in Virginia at close to the same rate. Starting in 2005, Virginia’s prevalence dropped faster than the national average.5 Youth smoking prevalence data has been compiled by the Virginia Tobacco Settlement Foundation , an entity created by the General Assembly as a result of the Master Settlement Agreement . The task of the VTSF was to lead the youth tobacco prevention efforts in Virginia, including conducting youth prevalence surveys and compiling youth prevalence information. Between 2001 and 2009, Virginia conducted the Youth Tobacco Survey Virginia has experienced a remarkable influx of new residents to the urban areas between 1980 and 2007 . While rural populations remained stable , urban areas received large numbers of immigrants from both domestic and international points of origin. In addition, Northern Virginia served as a bedroom community and suburb of Washington, DC. This large concentration of Virginia’s population in urban centers and near Washington, DC created a political divide within Virginia. Northern and urban areas were generally supportive of tobacco control efforts and leaned liberal in their political affiliations. Rural areas, especially in southwestern and southern areas of the state, tended to be more conservative, resistant to tobacco-control measures, and supportive of tobacco growers and manufacturers. Virginia’s executive is unique because the governor may not serve consecutive terms; therefore, unless elected for nonconsecutive terms, the governor may only serve one term.Virginia is also one of only 7 states in which the governor has the power to amend a bill after it has passed the General Assembly with a so-called amendatory veto.The amendatory veto allows the governor to “recommend one or more specific and severable amendments to a bill by returning it with his recommendations to the house in which it originated.”At that point, the General Assembly convenes for a special session after the conclusion of the regular session, during which they can approve the governor’s amendments with a simple majority vote of the members present or reject the governor’s amendments by a two-thirds vote of both houses’ present members.

If the Assembly does not agree on any of the amendments or rejects them all, the bill is returned to the governor as it was originally enrolled, without amendments. Whether or not the amendments are accepted or rejected, upon the bill’s return to the governor he or she can sign, veto, or allow it to become law without his or her signature. The governor can only offer one set of amendments per bill. The Virginia governor’s amendatory veto power is important because it gives the governor a role in directly suggesting legislative language, rather than informally recommending it. This gubernatorial power would play a key role in the 2007 session, when Governor Tim Kaine attempted to use his amendatory veto to strengthen the provisions of a weak law restricting smoking in restaurants. Virginia’s localities are given a limited degree of autonomy under a doctrine known as the Dillon’s Rule, named after the Iowa judge who articulated the theory in 1868.It states that all local government powers are derived from the state and are granted to the locality specifically by the state as a locality’s charter. Six states apply Dillon’s Rule: Virginia, Alabama, Idaho, Indiana, Mississippi, and Vermont. Virginia uses a strict construction for Dillon’s Rule embodied in the Virginia Constitution article VII, sections 2 and 3, which states that the General Assembly determines what powers local governments may exercise.However, all localities have some inherent police powers, which allow them to act to safeguard the health, safety, and welfare of their residents. In a Dillon’s Rule state like Virginia, these inherent powers are narrowly construed and limited to the essential functions of local government, such as establishing a police department. The converse doctrine is “home rule,” in which a locality is reserved all powers not expressly assigned to the state’s government .Essentially, a home rule locality may exercise its inherent powers for any purpose that is not expressly reserved for the state. Virginia had no constitutional provision analogous to the Tenth Amendment, which further limits the extent of a localities’ implied powers. Virginia’s localities consist of counties and cities. Counties have very limited inherent powers, and are effectively subdivisions of state government that mainly provide basic local services for their populations and assist in the local implementation of state laws and programs.Compared to counties,mobile shelves cities in Virginia are granted more autonomy to conduct affairs necessary to their local functioning, but are still constrained by Virginia’s application of Dillon’s Rule.

Cities are independent from counties, such that no city is part of the county in which it physically may reside. However, towns are considered parts of the counties in which they reside and serve merely as the local urban service provider of the county government. The distinctions between towns and cities are not well-defined, but for a city to be established, constitutionally-mandated population levels must be met.These additional powers are usually granted using specific legislation, which targets an individual locality. Rarely, legislation is sought that seeks to expand the powers of some or all cities at the same time. Cities have more autonomy to conduct local affairs through express grants of power from the state contained in their charter and through inherent police powers. In summary, Dillon’s Rule restricts the powers of localities in Virginia when compared with states using “home rule.” With regard to tobacco control, Dillon’s Rule stands for the presumption that localities are not generally able to regulate tobacco sales, advertising, or use without an express grant of the authority to do so from the General Assembly, unless the local tobacco control action can be considered to fall under the locality’s inherent police powers. Campaign contribution data from 1999 through 2007 were compiled by the National Institute on Money in State Politics from campaign finance disclosure statements filed by candidates and political parties with the relevant state agency. Campaign contributions from tobacco companies, tobacco trade organizations, lobbyists, employees of tobacco companies, tobacco warehouses, tobacco growers and tobacco manufacturers were considered to be tobacco related contributions and were included in the data presented below. Contributions for the 2009 election cycle were not available at the time of publication. Details of tobacco industry campaign contributions for 1999 through 2007 can be found by candidate in Appendix A, by contributor in Appendix B, and by political party in Appendix C. Virginia has no limits on campaign contributions, therefore the total amount of contributions differed greatly from another tobacco growing state, South Carolina, that did have campaign contribution limits.This difference probably led to much more money being contributed to Virginia candidates, which in other ways is similar to South Carolina as a southern, tobacco-growing state. . Note that Virginia conducts elections for the state legislature in odd years, while South Carolina conducts them in even years.In Virginia, the greatest tobacco industry contributions occurred in the 2001 and 2005 election cycles, which correspond with the gubernatorial elections of Mark Warner and Tim Kaine . As shown in Table 6, contributions to gubernatorial candidates comprised a significant amount of the total contributions during the 2001 and 2005 election cycles. The tobacco industry’s contributions to gubernatorial candidates were generally fairly evenly split among the competing candidates.While Virginia’s House was traditionally hostile to tobacco control legislation, the House General Laws committee was particularly so . The HGL committee normally hears any legislation that falls outside the purview of the other standing committees. All bills involving the Alcoholic Beverages Control Board or gaming are heard in the ABC/Gaming subcommittee of the HGL committee.23 Since at least the late 1980s, the HGL committee played a role in the death of many tobacco control bills. Between 2005 and 2008, the HGL committee was the last point of activity for all tobacco control bills heard in the House, with all of them dying. Table 9 shows the members of the HGL committee from 1999-2007, their tobacco policy scores, and their total campaign contributions from the period 1999-2007. While the HGL committee average policy score is 4.48 , which is not strongly pro-tobacco, many HGL committee members received significantly more tobacco industry campaign contributions than a typical Virginia legislator, who received on average less than $5,000. Contributions from major tobacco manufacturers comprised the bulk of total tobacco industry contributions, with individual contributions and contributions from smaller tobacco farms and tobacco warehouse facilities contributing relatively small amounts . Altria, the parent company of Philip Morris was the single largest contributor to candidates in Virginia from 2001 through 2007. Altria is headquartered in Richmond, and is the largest private employer in the region. US Smokeless Tobacco was also a major contributor, despite being headquartered in Connecticut and having no major manufacturing presence in Virginia. This change may lead to an increased lobbying and campaign contribution role for US Smokeless in the future in Virginia. Contributors of smaller amounts and contributions from individual employees of tobacco industry groups represented about a quarter of the $2,980,518 contributed by the tobacco industry from 1999-2007. During the period 1999 to 2007, contributions were made to both Democratic and Republican legislative candidates . When comparing all campaign contributions by party, the tobacco industry contributed significantly more to Republicans than Democrats in all years . 2001 and 2005 correspond to the gubernatorial campaigns that lead to the elections of governors Warner and Kaine, as discussed above, during which campaign contributions for legislative candidates also increased. The largest disparity was in 2005, when contributions to Republican candidates were $293,234 greater than contributions to Democrats. The difference was largely proportionate over all election cycles, which is similar to the proportions encountered in South Carolina.In total, Republican candidates for all offices received about twice the campaign contributions from the tobacco industry than Democrats .

How To Get Into Vertical Farming

Getting into vertical farming can be an exciting and potentially rewarding venture. Vertical farming involves growing crops in vertically stacked layers or structures,industrial rack often indoors, using controlled environment agriculture (CEA) techniques. Here’s a step-by-step guide to help you get started:

  1. Educate Yourself: Begin by learning as much as you can about vertical farming. Understand the different systems, technologies, and crops suitable for vertical farming. There are online courses, webinars, books, and articles available that can provide you with valuable knowledge.
  2. Research and Planning:
    • Market Research: Understand the demand for locally grown produce in your area. Identify potential customers, such as restaurants, grocery stores, or direct consumers.
    • Crop Selection: Choose crops that are well-suited for vertical farming. Leafy greens, herbs, microgreens, and strawberries are popular choices due to their relatively short growth cycles and compact sizes.
    • Location: Decide whether you’ll set up your vertical farm in an urban area, a suburban setting, or elsewhere. Consider factors like access to customers, resources, and space availability.
  3. Business Plan:
    • Define Your Business Model: Decide whether you’ll focus on selling directly to consumers, supplying restaurants and markets, or both.
    • Financial Projections: Create a detailed financial plan that outlines your startup costs, operational expenses, revenue projections, and potential profits.
    • Funding: Explore funding options, such as personal savings, loans, grants, or investors. A well-structured business plan will be crucial when seeking funding.
  4. Select the Right Technology:
    • Vertical Farming Systems: Choose the type of vertical farming system you want to implement, such as hydroponics, aeroponics, or aquaponics. Each system has its own pros and cons.
    • Lighting and Climate Control: Invest in efficient LED lighting systems and climate control equipment to create optimal growing conditions.
    • Automation and Monitoring: Implement automation systems that control factors like watering, nutrient distribution, and climate. Remote monitoring systems can help you keep track of your farm’s performance.
  5. Choose a Location:
    • Indoor Space: You’ll need a climate-controlled indoor space for your vertical farm. It could be a warehouse, a repurposed building, or a specially designed facility.
    • Utilities: Ensure access to water, electricity, and plumbing. Vertical farms require significant energy for lighting and climate control.
  6. Obtain Necessary Permits and Licenses:
    • Depending on your location and the scale of your operation, you may need permits for construction, water usage, waste disposal, and more.
  7. Set Up and Test:
    • Construct the infrastructure of your vertical farm, including growing racks, planting systems, and irrigation setups.
    • Test different setups and configurations to optimize plant growth, resource efficiency, and overall productivity.
  8. Start Growing:
    • Source high-quality seeds or seedlings for your chosen crops.
    • Implement your chosen growing techniques and monitor the plants’ progress closely.
  9. Market Your Produce:
    • Develop a marketing strategy to attract customers. Highlight the benefits of locally grown,cannabis drying rack fresh produce and your sustainable farming practices.
    • Utilize social media, local events, and partnerships to promote your products.
  10. Continuously Improve:
    • Collect data on crop growth, yields, and energy usage. Use this data to refine your growing techniques and improve efficiency.
    • Stay updated on advancements in vertical farming technology and best practices.

Remember that vertical farming can be complex, and there might be a learning curve involved. It’s essential to be patient, adaptable, and open to learning from your experiences.

The remaining 10 percent would be reinvested in the trust

The idea for a trust was based on the failed attempt to create a MSA health care trust fund in SB 323 in the 1999 legislative session, and Montana’s coal tax trust fund . The proposal would place 50% of the MSA proceeds into a trust, and the Legislature could only spend the principal of the trust with the approval of three-fourths majority of each chamber of the house.The health groups wanted to establish a trust fund because they believed that there would be attempts in future legislative sessions to raid MSA money for non-health related government programs.Legislators who spoke with reporters in October 1999 also agreed that the MSA money would be a target for future funding. Senator Dorothy Eck , who agreed that lawmakers would continue to spend MSA money on non-health related programs, told reporters that “[t]he political reality in this state is unless it’s in a constitutional trust, it won’t survive.”Representative John Cobb , who was actually opposed to creating the trust, also told reporters that it might be the only way to ensure that the MSA money is used for health care and tobacco prevention.To place the initiative on the ballot, the health groups would need to collect at least 40,000 voter signatures, and members estimated the cost of the campaign to get the initiative on the November 2000 ballot would be between $75,000 and $100,000, and an additional $150,000 to campaign for the initiative once it was on the ballot.In January 2000, Gov. Marc Racicot told the press that he was not yet ready to endorse the proposed ballot measure, explaining that though he liked the idea of a constitutional trust, he preferred setting aside 40% the MSA money into the trust and requiring a two-thirds approval by the legislature before being allowed to spend the principal .

The coalition’s proposal would put $427.5 million into a trust fund by 2025 and allow spending of $528.2 in interest earnings by 2030, customizable shelving while under the version preferred by Racicot, $342 million would be put into the fund and would allow spending of $422.6 in interest earning.Mick Robinson, Chief of Staff for Gov. Racicot, explained that the administration was worried about dedicating too much of the MSA money to the trust fund, which might not leave enough money for the state to meet more immediate budget needs that came up over the next quarter century.Racicot did not express a definitive position on the trust fund proposal, saying he wanted to think about the proposal more, and see a copy of the proposed initiative , before deciding whether to support it.Jim Ahrens, a spokesman for the coalition, said that members felt strongly that the 50% of MSA money should be deposited into the trust, but that the size of the legislative vote to approve spending from the trust’s principle was negotiable. Despite the difference of opinion on the specific numbers, Ahrens added that he was glad to hear Racicot favored a constitutional trust fund, instead of one created by a law that can be easily changed by the whims of future legislatures.On April 3, 2000, the Secretary of State approved the petition for the trust fund initiative prepared by the health groups, Constitutional Initiative 82. The health groups would next need to gather 40,000 signatures, which had to include 10 percent of the registered voters in 40 of the 100 House districts, by the June 23, 2000 deadline in order for CI-82 to be placed on the November 2000 ballot.The initiative, now changed to fit more with Gov. Racicot’s version of the proposal, would ask Montana voters to amend the state constitution to direct 40% of the tobacco settlement into the trust fund.

Under the terms of the revised initiative, the Montana Legislature could appropriate 90 percent of each year’s interest from the trust fund for health care programs.The principal of the trust could only be spent if two-thirds of the members of each house voted to do so.The health group coalition backing the proposal formerly organized themselves as a ballot issue committee , “The Alliance for a Healthy Montana” . AHM was made up of several health group organizations and individual contributors that provided services and financial support for the initiative campaign. By April 2000, the trust fund proposal was receiving public endorsements by Governor Racicot, as well as from the Governor’s Advisory Council on Tobacco Use Prevention.On April 18, 2000, Gov. Racicot signed the petition to put CI-82 on the November 2000 ballot,148 and told reporters that “I strongly urge Montanans to sign this petition and to take part in the electoral process.” Gov. Racicot added that “this trust fund will provide funds for not only this generation, but also for generations of Montanans in the future. It’s the kind of neighborly thing Montanans so typically do for one another.”Jim Ahrens, President of the Montana Hospitals Association who also chaired the AHM, stated that he believed that the governor’s endorsement was critical to the success of the initiative.On May 9, 2000, during a special session of the legislature, Sen. Bob Keenan , revealed a draft proposal to put a constitutional initiative on the November 2000 ballot, which would ask voters to place 100% of the MSA payments into the federal-state Medicaid insurance program.Under Keenan’s proposal, Montana would contribute $30 million to Medicaid, which would generate $78 million dollars in federal matching funds.

Keenan reasoned that the plan generated the best financial return for Montana – a total of $108 for Medicaid.Democrats, however, were immediately against Keenan’s Medicaid trust-fund proposal for two reasons. First, they expressed that the proposal would eliminate CI-82, which was in the signature gathering phase. Second, Democrats believed that if Keenan’s proposal passed, Republicans would divert state money usually used for Medicaid, replace it with MSA money, and then use the diverted money for non-health related programs, such as highways and tax relief.Democrats wanted to safeguard CI-82 as well as maintain past levels of state contributions to Medicaid, and therefore intended to have Keenan’s proposal delayed until the 2001 regular session. Democrats explained that in the full 2001 Legislature, they would have more time to debate and consider proposed amendments. As a result of the negative reaction from Democrats, Keenan would quickly revise his proposal in the hope that it could gain broader support from both the House and Senate.In response to the opposition against his proposal, vertical farming systems Keenan presented what he described as two complimentary bills – Senate Bill 12 and Senate Bill 13.Senate Bill 12 was the revised version of the Medicaid trust fund proposal, and would ask voters in the November 2000election to amend the state constitution so that 40% of the MSA money be dedicated to the Medicaid program. Senate Bill 13 duplicated the CI-82 ballot measure exactly as the Alliance for a Healthy Montana had proposed it, dedicating 40% of the state’s MSA money to a permanent trust fund, with the interest being used for health care and tobacco use prevention programs.A hearing for both SB 12 and SB 13 was held before the Senate Finance and Claims Committee on May 10, 2000, with proponent testimony coming from member organizations of the AHM. No testimony was presented in opposition to either bill.Jim Ahrens, Executive Director of AHM, in supporting SB 12, stated that Medicaid funding was essential because health care facilities, such as hospitals and nursing homes, employed about 18,000 Montanans, with a yearly cost in wages of about $500 million a year. Ahrens then testified in support of SB 13, and told the Senate Committee that the AHM would abandon its petition drive and devote its efforts to November passage of SB 13 if it was approved by the Legislature.Rose Hughes, Executive Director of the Montana Health Care Association, told the Senate Committee that her organization supported SB 12 because the state Medicaid programs had been underfunded for years and that medical facilities in Montana had not been adequately paid to provide care.In support of SB 13, Hughes testified that her organization “would be happy not to be out on the streets with our petitions if [the legislature] go ahead and refer this directly to the people.”

In addition to the health groups, representatives from state agencies also expressed their support for SB 12 and SB 13. At the Senate Committee hearing for SB 13, Deputy Attorney General Beth Baker told the Senate Committee that the Montana Department of Justice was committed to the goals of reducing tobacco use and public health problems caused by smoking. Furthermore, Baker told the Senate Committee that Attorney General Mazurek had long supported allocations from the MSA for public health programs.Attorney General Mazurek himself told reporters that the two bills “were critical components to address the [health care] goals of the settlement.”Both SB 12 and SB 13 received unchallenged support throughout most of the legislative hearing process before facing a vote by the full House. On May 10, 2000, both SB 12 and SB 13 were approved by the Senate Finance and Claims Committee, both by a vote of 16 to 1. Each bill was then approved by the full Senate – SB 12 passed by a vote of 50 to 0, and SB 13 passed by a vote of 45 to 5.Both were referred to the House Human Services Committee for a hearing on the next day, May 11, 2000.Member organizations of the AHM again expressed their support before the House Committee, with no opposing testimony being offered.The House Committee approved both bills , which were then sent to the full House for a vote.Once the two bills reached the full House on May 11, 2000, SB 12 would meet heavy resistance from representatives, while SB 13 would be approved. Though SB 12 had overwhelming support early in the hearing process, Democrat and Republican House members began to question the amount of money that would be tied up by both of the trust proposals. House Speaker John Mercer told members that “[i]t would restrict the things the next Legislature could do.”House members felt the state could not afford to dedicate 80% of the MSA payments, leaving only 20% for the general fund, because too little would be left for unpredictable cash needs in the next two years.Thus, without strong backing from either the Democrats or Republicans, SB 12 was defeated in the House 74 to 24.On the other hand, SB 13 had strong backing from Democratic legislators, the Republican Governor, the State Attorney General, and multiple state health groups.Furthermore, the health groups had pushed their trust fund initiative into the media’s attention during their original petition drive for CI-82. Thus, SB 13 was approved in the House by a vote of 69 to 24, and would be placed on the November 2000 ballot as Constitutional Amendment 35 .In addition to strong support from Governor Racicot’s administration and Democratic legislators, CA-35 proved to be popular with the electorate. Telephone polls conducted between May 22-24 by Mason-Dixon Polling and Research, Inc. of Washington, D.C. for the Lee Newspapers of Montana questioned 620 likely voters about all the initiatives on the ballot for the November 2000 election.When asked about CA-35, 76% of the respondents said they supported the trust fund, 11% were opposed, and 13% were undecided. The poll’s margin of error was 4%.158 Voter support for CA-35 continued in the months leading to the November election. Another Mason-Dixon telephone poll conducted for Lee Newspapers between September 21-23 questioned 625 registered voters about November ballot initiatives. When asked about CA-35, 62% of the respondents supported the trust fund, 22% were opposed, and 16% were undecided.Newspaper coverage of CA-35 focused on the main proponent and sponsor of the initiative, Senator Bob Keenan, and Senator Ken Miller , who became a vocal public opponent of the initiative In addition to receiving financial contributions from the tobacco industry, a May 9, 2001 letter from Senator Miller to Roger Mozingo, Vice President for State Government Relations at R.J. Reynolds, demonstrates that a continuing relationship existed between Sen. Miller and R.J. Reynolds.

Organizations identified as tobacco industry allies were the Montana Tavern Association and the Hospitality PAC

The memorandum further explained that “[w]hile this does not change our interest in getting media outlets to reduce the ratio to the lowest possible number, it does explain [the broadcasters’] hesitancy to abandon fairness doctrine principles as they pertain to ballot issues…”A May 15, 1990 Tobacco Institute ballot issue update memorandum written by Bob McAdam and Stan Bowman indicated that progress had been made in recruiting some of these groups as allies: “Excellent progress is being made in Montana, particularly in the area of coalition building. During the past two weeks, expressions of support have been obtained from, most notably, the state’s grocers’s association and several veteran’s groups.”A June 18, 1990 incomplete tobacco industry ballot issue update also stated that “…the campaign is beginning to line up the people necessary for the grassroots elements of the campaign. By identifying allies in various parts of the state, it appears that our effort will have significant local level involvement.”Observations of support from ally groups were also given in the 1993 Journal of Public Health Policy paper, “The 1990 Montana Initiative to Increase Cigarette Taxes: Lessons for Other State and Localities,”which reported that the “Montana American Legion opposed the measure, fearing its passage would jeopardize tobacco tax funding for the proposed Veteran’s Nursing Home in eastern Montana, and sent letters to all its members urging a ‘no’ vote,” even though the tobacco industry had fought against the 1989 cigarette tax increase to fund the veterans’ facilities in the first place.Also, “[t]he Montana Alliance for Progressive Policy, a liberal group opposing the increase as an unfair tax on poor people, received $22,500 from a tobacco industry lobby group to produce and send brochures to its 50,000 members urging rejection.”In addition to recruiting already existing groups as allies in the fight against the cigarette tax initiative, the tobacco industry also directly organized and coordinated at least one group, the Montana’s Smoker’s Caucus. An October 5, 1990 R.J. Reynolds interoffice memorandum to Jim Johnston, CEO of R.J. Reynolds, from Thomas C. Griscom, Executive Vice-President of External Relations for R.J. Reynolds, states that Jean Gowdy, Executive Director of the Montana Smoker’s Caucus,ebb and flow setup was an RJR smoker’s rights group leader who was recruited by Philip Morris, and that the Smoker’s Caucus’ activities were coordinated by Philip Morris, though this information was never released to the public.

Starting in October 1990, Jean Gowdy would make numerous public appearances as the Executive Director of the Montana Smokers’ Caucus in opposition to I-115, all the while maintaining the appearance of the group as an independent organization with no ties to the tobacco industry. On October 11, 1990, the Montana Smokers’ Caucus issued the press release, “Montana Taxpayers Unite Against Initative-115,” in which Gowdy argued that I-115 would create more costly, unnecessary bureaucracy and would “continue the dangerous trend of government intrusion into people’s lives and personal decisions.”Gowdy also claimed that it would further burden those in the lower income brackets and that the initiative was an unwise use of state resources.According to the press release, the “Smoker’s Caucus originated in 1988 by citizens of Montana who choose to smoke and who are concerned about fair public policies. Since then, more than 1100 Montanan residents have expressed interest in defending their individual rights.”The Montana Smoker’s Caucus press release was mentioned in 6 Montana Newspapers , from October 13, 1990 to November 4, 1990, for a total of 32 times. The combined circulation of all newspapers was 214,541 .These newspapers carried the arguments in the Smoker’s Caucus press release to the broader public. Gowdy was also quoted in several Montana newspapers as saying, “I don’t feel it’s a smoker vs. non-smoker issue, it’s the additional taxes and bureaucracy.” Additionally, Gowdy appeared on 5 local news programs in Great Falls, Helena, Butte, and Bozeman, and spoke on 3 radio talk shows from October 15, 1990 to October 24, 1990, each time repeating the arguments made in the press release.None of the interviews with Gowdy reported any affiliation or funding by the tobacco industry, and some newspaper reports even strengthened the impression that the Montana Smoker’s Caucus was entirely independent of tobacco industry influence. The Billings Gazette on November 4, 1990 reported that the “Smokers Caucus is not affiliated with the Tobacco Consumers, Distributors and Producers Opposed to Unfair Tobacco Sales Taxes.”In an October 15, 1990 interview on the KMBN Talk Radio show in Bozeman, Gowdy was questioned about how the organization was formed. In her response, Gowdy’s did not mention her affiliations with R.J. Reynolds or Philip Morris. I-115 was defeated on November 6, 1990, by a margin of 59% to 41%, with voter opposition coming mainly from rural counties and the two largest cities, Billings and Great Falls.The initiative received its strongest support from the smaller cities of Missoula, Bozeman, and Helena.About six months after the defeat of I-115, the July 17, 1991 edition of the Smoker’s Advocate, published by Philip Morris, named Jean Gowdy as the Smokers’ Advocate of the Month.The article explained that Gowdy had fought a “war” against Montana’s 1990 tax initiative by touring the state, appearing on television talk shows, speaking on the radio, and writing opinion letters to news editors. Though, curiously, no mention was made of the Montana Smokers’ Caucus or its claimed 1100 members, nor was the group mentioned in any of the tobacco industry documents since the 1990 tax initiative.

The tobacco industry spends a significant amount of money in Montana on campaign contribution to legislative candidates, constitutional officer candidates, and political parties, as well as through expenses incurred through the work of their state lobbyists. It should also be noted that financial contributions are made to state officials which are not recorded through the Office of Political Practices, or any other supervising state government agency. For instance, Gov. Judy Martz, while serving as Governor from 2001-2004, was the honorary chairperson of the Montana Majority Fund, a tax-exempt political organization which was not subject to reporting rules by the Federal Elections Commission, and which received thousands of dollars of financial contributions from several tobacco companies . Also, Senator Ken Miller served as Montana’s State Public Chairman of ALEC , a national advocacy group made up of conservative state lawmakers, and which received financial contributions from the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company. Such ties between the tobacco industry and state officials or political organizations are difficult to discover. As such, it is likely that the amount of financial expenditures reported by the tobacco industry is considerably less than the amount it actually spends in its efforts to affect tobacco control policy. Organizations included as “tobacco industry” funding sources were: Brown and Williamson, Lorillard Tobacco Co., Philip Morris Inc. , R.J. Reynolds, Smokeless Tobacco Council, the Tobacco Institute, and US Tobacco. Miller Brewing Co. was also included for lobbying expenditures because the company did not make any substantial contributions to state legislative or statewide candidates, but did spend significant amounts in state lobbying.Other tobacco industry allies, such as the Montana Gaming Industry Association,sliding grow tables were not included because they made almost no campaign contributions. Campaign contributions from tobacco industry lobbyists were included, with each lobbyists given their own category . Contributions data for candidates and elected officials was collected for 1989-2002, and data for contributions to political action committees and lobbyist expenditures was collected for 1993-2002. A complete list of all candidates and elected officials for 2002 and their tobacco industry campaign contributions, as well as tobacco industry lobbying expenditures, are listed in the Appendix. included a gubernatorial election , other statewide elections, and legislative elections.

The amount spent includes campaign contributions to individual statewide candidates, legislators and legislative candidates, as well as to political parties, and lobbying expenditures made by tobacco companies and their allies. This was about an 8% increase from the amount spent by the tobacco industry and it’s allies from 1995-1998 when total expenditures were $90,162 , a period that also included a gubernatorial election as well as legislative and state campaigns. Financial contributions to legislative candidates from the tobacco industry and its ally groups have steadily increased since the 1995-1996 elections cycle . While tobacco industry contributions to both parties have increased, Republican legislative candidates have received more tobacco industry contributions in each election cycle than Democrat legislative candidates since 1992 . Furthermore, the difference between the contributions to Republicans and Democrats has widened since 1996. Tobacco industry contributions to influential House and Senate committees were also examined, because such committees can play a significant role in tobacco control policy making. Of all the committees examined, only the House Committee on Appropriations received $1,000 or more in tobacco industry contributions from 1999-2002 . The House Committee on Appropriations reviewed all of the proposed bills dealing with the allocation of Master Settlement Agreement money since 1999 . This included the allocations received by the tobacco use prevention program, which have been a major point of conflict between tobacco control advocates and legislators wanting to spend MSA funds in other government areas . Those in the committee receiving the most tobacco industry contributions were Appropriations Committee Vice-Chair Rep. John E. Witt , Rep. Rick Ripley , and William Glaser . Lobbying expenditures were higher than others years between 1997 and 1998, and between 2001 and 2002. Between 1997 and 1998, the majority of lobbying expenses came from the Montana Tavern Association, which spent $41,025 in opposition to several proposed state liquor and gambling license restrictions in the 1997 Legislative Session. Also in 1997, Philip Morris paid $14,700 in fees to its state lobbyist John Delano and Leo Berry. Berry was a partner in the Helena law firm Browning, Kaleczyc, Berry, & Hoven, P.C , which was meeting with a variety of state officials and state organizations to coordinate Philip Morris’s PMUSA Field Action Team Program in the late 1990s and into 200178, 79 . Lobbying expenditures from the tobacco industry were also relatively high from 2001 to 2002. In addition to continued efforts from tobacco companies to build and coordinate state coalitions during that time, the 2001 Legislative Session heard a great deal of debate regarding Gov. Judy Martz’ proposed budget cuts in the state’s tobacco use prevention program. In 2001, tobacco use prevention program funding was cut to it’s lowest point under Gov. Martz, whose chief political advisors were tobacco industry lobbyist Mark Baker and Baker’s legal partner, tobacco industry lobbyist Jerome Anderson. It was also between 2001 and 2002 when Mark Baker created the Montana Majority Fund, a Republican committee to financially support state and national campaigns, which received thousand of dollars from tobacco companies. Gov. Martz also served as honorary chairperson of the Montana Majority Fund . According to the Institute on Money in State Politics , the average amount of money raised by the winner of Montana Legislature elections in 2002 was $5,619 for House members, and $11,469 for Senate members. This level of campaign contributions is relatively small compared to larger states, such as California, so the amount of money received from the tobacco industry is, likewise, smaller in comparison. In examining Montana’s relatively low campaign contributions, it should also be noted that Montana has the most stringent contribution limits in the nation.In 1994, Montana voters passed an initiative to lower contribution limits from $250 per election cycle for House candidates and $400 for Senate candidates, to a maximum of $100 per election for both House and Senate candidates.Contribution limits specified in the 2003 Montana Code for candidates running for other offices in Montana are low as well. Individual contributions to a gubernatorial candidate are limited to $500. For candidates of other statewide elected offices, the limit is $250.As a result of these low limits, in the last ten years Montana has seen an increase in self-financed candidates who can give their own campaigns unlimited amounts of money, and who do not have to raise a large number of small individual contributions.Previous research has demonstrated a relationship between campaign contributions from the tobacco industry and policy making behavior among legislators.We sought to test this relationship in Montana by using the 1999-2002 campaign contributions data.

The small ITN fixed in the sleeping room ceiling acted as a decoy trap

As a result, entry rates and hence malaria transmission are affected by house construction. Thus, improved housing construction is regarded as among the main methods to control malaria since early 20th century. Although the importance of housing for health is recognized, few well-designed studies have quantified its impact, especially in the developing world. Previous studies in a malaria endemic community in Sri Lanka found a strong association between malaria incidence and the type of house construction, independent of the house’s location and residents’ behavioural patterns. The risk of getting malaria was greater for inhabitants of the poorest type of houses, characterized by incomplete construction with thatched roofs and walls made of mud or cadjan , compared with better-constructed houses with complete brick and plastered walls and tiled roofs. A significantly higher number of indoor resting mosquitoes were found in the poorly constructed houses than in the better-constructed ones. In a later study in the same area, the risk of malaria was found to be 2.5-fold higher for people living in poorly constructed houses than for those living in houses of good construction. In Tanzania, houses built of bricks and with zinc roofs are associated with lower levels of malaria-associated anaemia compared to poorly built mud-walled houses. Similarly, in rural Gambia, installing ceilings or closing eaves in experimental huts was found to protect people from malaria mosquitoes. Being endophilic and endophagic, all efforts done to reduce entry of malaria vectors through improved house construction, in particular screening against mosquito entry,hydroponic benches has long been recommended as a way of reducing human exposure to mosquito bites and infection with malaria parasites.

Insect behaviour can be exploited when designing control strategies for control of disease vectors and other pests. Anopheles gambiae, the main malaria vector in Africa, is well-adapted for entering houses, because it flies upwards when encountering a vertical surface. Attracted to human odours emanating from a house, many Anopheles gambiae reach an outside wall and fly up, funneled indoors by the overhanging roof of the typical village house design, through the open eaves. This mode of house entry suggests that closing eaves or installing ceilings would give protection . This implies that houses with open eaves, or which lack ceilings, are associated with increased numbers of mosquitoes and higher levels of malaria compared with neighbouring houses with closed eaves or ceilings.The objective of this study, therefore, was to determine the effect of ceilings made from locally available traditional building materials as barriers against house-entry by malaria vectors in an endemic rice irrigation scheme area in the lowlands of western Kenya.Our study was carried out in Kore and Ahero irrigation scheme sub-locations in Ombeyi division of Nyando district . It is located 24 km southeast of Kisumu in Nyanza province in western Kenya, 15 km south of the Equator at an altitude of 1,150 m above sea level . It covers an area of 29 km2 and has a population of about 7,891 people. Annual mean temperatures vary between 17°C and 32°C. The area is relatively humid due to its proximity to Lake Victoria. Local climate is characterized by three peaks of rains with an average annual rainfall of 1,000 – 1,800 mm and an average relative humidity of 65%. The first peak of rains occurs between March and July, with an average monthly rainfall of 150 – 260 mm. The other rainy season occurs in August. Short rains occur between September and October and have an average monthly rainfall of at least 125 mm. The dry period occurs between December and February. The main economic activities include rice irrigation, subsistence farming, cultivating maize, sorghum, cassava, millet, and vegetables.

Many people keep animals including cattle, goats, sheep, and poultry. Other activities include fishing due to its proximity to Lake Victoria and the Nyando River. There is local marketing of food and grain to the nearby small town of Ahero and to Kisumu. Some villagers commute daily to work in Kisumu city. Study villages were selected because they overlapped with the area used as the focus of other related studies, making possible the use of existingbaseline information. Previous studies in the area show that most of the houses are typically constructed of a stick framework with mud walls and thatch or corrugated metal roof. Malaria is highly endemic in the region. Transmission occurs throughout the year. The mean annual Plasmodium falciparum sporozoite inoculation rates range from 90 to 410 infective bites per year. The principal mosquito vectors in the area are Anopheles gambiae, Anopheles funestus and Anopheles arabiensis. Of the three malaria vectors, Anopheles gambiae s.l. and Anopheles funestus are highly endophagic and anthropophagic, with a mean of seven adult females collected per house.From early October 2007 to the end of February 2008, indoor-resting mosquito densities were determined based on the pyrethrum spray collection method. There were 80 sampling occasions each for treatment and control houses at two week intervals during the study period. Before a pyrethrum spray collection from a selected house, a member of the household was asked about the number of people who had slept there the previous night. A team of one entomologist and two assistants collected mosquitoes from the house. After all exits had been covered, a white cotton sheet was placed on the floor, and a pyrethrum-based un-residual insecticide was sprayed in the room. Ten minutes later, the dead mosquitoes were collected from the sheet, stored in separate individual vials for each house and kept in a cooler box. Allmosquitoes collected were transported back to the laboratory at Kenya Medical Research Institute, identified with a microscope on the same day and recorded by species, gender, and by degree of blood meal engorgement status for females.Before randomly selecting study houses for entomologic sampling, the exact location of all houses in the two villages was determined with a hand-held global positioning system receiver . A unique identification number was clearly marked on the door beam of the entrance to each house.

This information was used to establish a geographic information system for study houses using ArcView software, which made it possible to randomly select study houses using random number selection method. Randomly selected study houses were typical traditional semi permanent defined as having a stick framework, mud walls and iron sheet roofs. They had open eaves with at least three regular sleepers. Selected houses were replaced with the nearest neighbour house, if they did not fulfil the above criteria.Permethrin extract Icon 10 WP was obtained from the pyrethrum board of Kenya, Nakuru. Before nets were impregnated,commercial greenhouse benches the amount of water they retain at saturation was determined by measuring the amount of water left after dipping a net of known area in a known volume of water. The amount of water absorbed by 1 m2 netting material was used to calculate the volume of insecticide required for impregnation of a given area of netting at a rate of 0.5/m2. Once impregnated, netting was left to dry in a shaded area before fixing it in a 1.5 feet ceiling opening above the sleeping room .Individual and group interviews were conducted with house owners, village elders and traditional house constructors. All adult interviewees had knowledge of malaria and indicated mosquitoes as its possible vector. Most community members favourably accepted papyrus ceilings as a relatively cheaper method of malaria vector control. There were no significant differences in the response given by spouses. Responses were remarkably consistent, demonstrating a general perception that ceilings played an important role in vector control and improve the general functionality and beauty of houses. Most houses in the overall study area had no ceilings or closed eaves. Ninety two percent cited cost of importing soil for house construction and high daytime temperatures as main reasons for leaving eaves open. Extra effort required in weaving papyrus mats and incorporating them in house construction were cited as the main reasons for not including papyrus ceilings in houses.There is need for those keen to control malaria in the tropics not to forget a lesson from the past; i.e., that improvements in living conditions can reduce malaria. Unfortunately, quite often inadequate attention is given to changes in house design as a contributing factor to reduction of malaria in many parts of the world. In this study, we demonstrated that addition of a simple ceiling with insecticide impregnated netting fixed above the sleeping room of traditionally designed houses can substantially reduce human exposure to mosquito vectors of malaria. The ceiling modification reduced house entry by Anopheles gambiae s.l. by about 76–82%. This degree of protection compares well with the 86–91% and 80% reduction in biting seen with insecticide-treated bed nets and different ceiling materials, respectively, reported from earlier studies using experimental huts. Presumably, host odours from the room pass up through the netting and out the eaves, attracting mosquitoes into the roof space, where they were prevented from entering the room by the ceiling and are killed when they contact the ITN.

Previous studies have shown, depending on the material used and the resistance profile of local mosquitoes, that the protection afforded by such insecticide treated netting does not repel mosquitoes from entering via the door or window. This qualifies the fact that differences in vector densities between control and intervention houses were dependent on the condition of eaves. If, however, insecticide was applied to curtains around the door and windows it is likely that protection would be further improved. Treating curtains with permethrin at a village scale in Burkina Faso was associated with a reduction in malaria vectors by about 99.5%. On the other hand, in places where people are reluctant to use bednets because there are few nuisance mosquitoes, ceilings or closed eaves could be an effective alternative method of protection. Previous studies at Ahero indicate that more than 90% of villagers are indoors and in their beds by 2100 hr. Biting activity is low before this time. The risk of getting bitten increases in the later hours of the night. Modified ceilings provide protection for the entire family against bites from malaria vectors, compared to bednets which protect only the person or persons sleeping under the net. Through interviews and surveys, we determined that almost all traditional house designs have open eaves because importing soil to fill in the opening is too costly and eaves provide ventilation against high indoor temperatures during the day. Permanent houses had closed eaves and fixed ceilings. This indicates that due to house design inhabitants of traditional houses are at a higher risk of being bitten by malaria infected mosquitoes than are people who live in permanent houses. Although not statistically significant, papyrus reeds mats ceilings did not make rooms hotter, but they did reduce evaporation by about 2–5%. Unlike previous studies in which different ceiling materials were used, our modification did not reduce air flow or make rooms feel stuffy. Our design allowed air circulation through mats and the ITN window, thus increasing acceptability of papyrus ceilings to home owners. Modified houses were noticeably cooler during the day and warmer during the night. This is consistent with the insulation effect of the ceiling to heat from iron sheet roofs and heat from living room during the day and night respectively. Results from focus group interviews indicate that ceilings were cheap, considered to beautify houses, widely associated with reduced temperatures and less associated disturbance by mosquitoes, all of which support the notion that installing ceilings to reduce entry by mosquitoes would likely receive broad community support. Using readily available traditional building material for ceiling construction was inexpensive. It costs about a dollar/person; assuming a ceiling life of over 10 years and three people per house. The only out of pocket costs are for screening and insecticide. Control measures against mosquito bites are expected to have a beneficial impact by reducing malaria morbidity and mortality. The degree of control needed to obtain a particular public health impact would clearly vary among sites, and control strategies should take the initial transmission levels into account. For example, there is evidence from The Gambia that communities with the lowest vector densities are at greatest risk of disease.

A homogeneous risk of smoking and passive smoking was assumed

Smoke-free workplaces substantially reduce exposure to secondhand smoke and the associated cardiovascular risks for passive smokers. Smoke-free workplaces also reduce cigarette consumption among smoking employees by 29% by making it easier for them to quit or reduce consumption . However, only about 69% of U.S. indoor workers reported being covered by a smoke free workplace policy in 1999 . Because the risks of myocardial infarction fall rapidly after smoking cessation and, presumably, after reduced exposure to secondhand smoke, we projected the cardiovascular health and economic effects if all remaining U.S. workplaces were made smoke free.The indoor worker sample that was not covered by a smoke-free workplace policy was estimated by multiplying the total indoor worker sample by the percentage of workers lacking such coverage . This cohort was then divided into active and passive smokers by multiplying the indoor worker sample lacking smoke-free workplace policy coverage by the smoking prevalence for adults aged 18 to 64 years . This prevalence was calculated by multiplying age-specific smoking prevalence by the respective age cohort from the 2000 Census . Nonsmoking indoor workers lacking smoke-free workplace policy coverage were defined as passive smokers.The 29% reduction in total cigarette consumption when a workplace becomes smoke free is a result of a 3.8% reduction in absolute smoking prevalence and a 1.3 cigarette per day reduction in daily consumption among continuing smokers. The resultant quitter sample was calculated by multiplying the percentage of quitters by the active smoker indoor worker sample.

We assumed that quitting occurred immediately following policy introduction . We made several assumptions about passive smoking. First, a national smoke-free workplace policy immediately eliminates passive smoking in all workplaces currently not covered by a policy . Second,vertical cannabis grow passive smokers who work indoors are not exposed to passive smoking outside of work. Finally, we did not account for reductions in passive smoking outside of the workplace, at home, or in other locations.The 2000 U.S. adult per capita cigarette consumption was 104.3 packs per year . The 2000 adult smoker per capita cigarette consumption is equal to the adult per capita cigarette consumption divided by the adult smoking prevalence , or 447.6 packs per year. The annual reduction in cigarette consumption due to a nationwide smoke-free workplace policy is equal to the consumption forgone by quitters plus the consumption reduction among remaining smokers. The consumption forgone by quitters is the number of quitters multiplied by the 2000 adult smoker per capita consumption. The consumption reduction is the number of remaining smokers multiplied by both the 2000 adult smoker per capita consumption and the 12.2% reduction in cigarette consumption. The 2000 pretax price of a pack of cigarettes was $2.36 . The total pretax value of forgone cigarette consumption to the tobacco industry is equal to the total number of forgone packs multiplied by the pretax pack price.The number of prevented deaths was the sum of prevented immediate deaths and prevented deaths within a given year following the event. Prevented immediate deaths were the product of the number of prevented events and the probability of immediate death from the event. Prevented deaths within 1 year of the initial event were the difference between the number of prevented events and the number of prevented immediate deaths, multiplied by the survival probability. These deaths were then adjusted to account for gradual reduction in risk over time using the midpoint methodology listed previously. The immediate mortality rate for myocardial infarction was 0.115 for men and 0.167 for women ; the rate for stroke was 0.043 . The annual survival probability was 0.992 for men at risk of acute myocardial infarction and 0.995 for women, and 0.993 for persons at risk of stroke .

The annual survival probability in the first year after a myocardial infarction was 0.812 for men and 0.765 for women; after a stroke, the probability was 0.663 . The annual survival probability in subsequent years following a myocardial infarction was 0.994 for men and 0.933 for women; for stroke, the probability was 0.961 . Steady-state results were calculated by advancing this cohort through time. For each subsequent year, the surviving cohort was calculated by multiplying the previous cohort by the annual survival probability. This new cohort was then multiplied by the event incidence and by the difference between relative risks from the prior year and the current year. Prevented total events, immediate deaths, and total deaths were calculated as described previously. Savings from the prior years were also calculated after multiplying the prior cohort by the annual survival probabilities. Due to the midpoint correction, half of the sample was multiplied by the annual survival probability one more time than its corresponding other sample half in each time period. A Monte Carlo simulation was performed to estimate the distribution of the reduction in cardiovascular events. Ten thousand trials were generated. Individual parameters that were varied simultaneously in the simulation included the percentage of workers covered by smoke-free workplace policies,smoking prevalence, effect of smoke-free workplace policies on quitting, initial and steady-state relative risks of myocardial infarctions and strokes, initial relative risk of myocardial infarction among passive smokers, and incidence of myocardial infarctions and strokes . The steady-state relative risk of myocardial infarctions among passive smokers was not varied. Normal distributions were used, except for relative risks that had a log-normal distribution . We report our findings by using the median of the Monte Carlo simulation. The 2.5% and 97.5% points in the distribution are reported .We found that making workplaces smoke free not only reduces worker exposure to secondhand smoke, but also contributes substantially to reducing cardiovascular disease among nonsmokers and smokers. Nonsmokers who are no longer exposed to secondhand smoke realize 60% of the benefit and smokers who quit realize 40% of the benefit.

Although passive smokers have a lower risk of heart disease than do smokers, the sample at risk is nearly three times larger than the active smoking sample. In addition, smoke-free workplaces eliminate risks to all passive smokers even though they only lead some active smokers to quit entirely. This analysis underestimates the true cost of cardiovascular disease due to smoking. We made no estimates of stroke reduction among passive smokers, nor did we include any indirect savings from prevented lost work productivity. In addition, we did not estimate the health and resultant economic effects of reduced consumption among remaining smokers,commercial drying room as well as the effects on reductions in passive smoking that occur outside of the workplace.Although we used a uniform estimate for smoking prevalence and smoke-free workplace coverage in this analysis, smoking prevalence and smoke-free workplace coverage varies by occupation . Blue-collar and service workers are more likely to smoke and less likely to be covered by a smoke-free workplace policy compared with white-collar workers . Smoke-free workplaces also lead to greater reductions in smoking prevalence among blue-collar and service workers compared with white collar workers . Since smoke-free workplace policy effects are based primarily on white-collar workers, we may have underestimated the effect of a national smoke free workplace policy because a larger proportion of the affected persons would be blue-collar and service workers. This underestimation is counterbalanced by the smaller fractions of blue-collar passive smokers and blue collar indoor workers. Unfortunately, the most recent estimates of smoking prevalence, smoke-free workplace coverage, and smoke-free workplace effect by occupation are 10 years old, from the 1992–1993 Current Population Survey . As a result, we did not use occupation specific rates in this analysis. Our analysis may also overestimate the effect of a national smoke-free workplace policy given recent increases in smoke-free workplace policies. Data from selected states in 2000 indicate that there have been increases in smoke-free workplace coverage compared with the 1999 data used for this analysis . Furthermore, findings from our model may have been affected by improvements in treatments for cardiovascular disease. However, improvements in care may also be more costly, in which case prevention of cardiovascular events may result in further health care savings. Not all persons are regular smokers; some are occasional smokers. This analysis does not directly address this issue as we could not differentiate between occasional smokers and regular smokers. Occasional smoker consumption was folded in with all smokers, and likely contributed to some of the quitting behavior seen with smoke-free workplaces. Previous research has shown a correlation between more comprehensive smoke-free workplace policies and either staying an occasional smoker or becoming a former smoker 1 year following implementation of a smoke-free workplace policy . Smoke-free workplace policies are also associated with reductions in youth smoking prevalence and consumption . These reductions exceed expected reductions from working teenagers, suggesting that these policies have additional indirect effects, such as alterations of social norms, and thus will have long-run effects on reducing heart disease mortality by reducing the number of new smokers.

While smoke-free workplaces yield substantial health benefits in terms of cardiovascular disease, the tobacco industry would also be substantially affected by a nationwide smoke-free workplace policy. Over 900 million cigarette packs would go unsmoked, and the tobacco industry at large would lose over $2.3 billion in revenue every year. This substantial cost to the tobacco industry explains why it opposes these measures so vigorously. Legislation is the best way to create smoke-free workplaces. Although this analysis addresses the hypothetical case of making all U.S. workplaces smoke free at once, action at the state or national level is least likely to provide strong smoke-free legislation due to the massive ability of the tobacco industry to make campaign contributions and hire well-connected lobbyists. Such legislation is generally best done at the local level, where public health forces are relatively strong and the tobacco industry’s influence is relatively weak .Watercress is a leafy-green crop in the Brassicaceae family, consumed widely across the world for its peppery taste and known to be the most nutrient dense salad leaf . The peppery taste is the result of high concentrations of glucosinolates – phytochemicals which can be hydrolyzed to isothiocyanates upon plant tissue damage, such as chewing, known for their potent anticancer , anti-inflammatory , and antioxidant effects that are beneficial to human health. Although ITCs are the main products of digestion depending on pH, metal ions, and other epithiospecifier proteins, nitriles can also be formed through GLS break-down and they too may have chemopreventitive properties . Watercress is high value horticultural crop. A specialty leafy vegetable, with a growing area of 282 ha in the US, with 75 ha of production in California, compared to 58 ha in the UK . It is also a high-value horticultural crop in the UK, with the market value of £8.90 per kg compared to £4.97 per kg for mixed baby leaf salad bags and represents a total value of £15 million per year . Watercress is traditionally grown in outdoor aquatic systems, but there is increasing interest in its suitability for indoor hydroponic systems, such as in vertical farms . VF utilize hydroponic or aeroponic systems that allow plant stacking in multiple vertical or horizontal layers increasing the effective use of space and other resources, particularly water . Indoor vertical agriculture is well-suited to the production of leafy greens. Their fast growth rate, high harvest index, low photosynthetic energy demand and compact shape make them ideal for indoor farming technologies . VFs have multi-layered indoor crop production space with the use of artificial lights and soilless cultivation systems. With the capacity to control lighting, ventilation, irrigation, nutrient levels, and abiotic stress, VFs offer the potential of high and predictable yields and uniform produce alongside reduced water use and often no pesticide applications whatsoever . The future of indoor food production is likely to include other high-value horticultural crops such as several leafy greens, culinary herbs, strawberries, and flowers. Breeding targets for these crops include short life cycles, low energy demands, improved yield , small root systems, as well novel sensory and nutritional profiles . VF systems are gaining traction for commercial scale cultivation, partly due to their ability to deliver locally-grown food to urban areas, with lower environmental costs and also to deliver food in locations where fresh produce cannot be easily grown .

MVOCs may undergo oxidative chemical reactions indoors with radicals and ozone

The microbes on surfaces could be considered inputs if they lead to indoor emissions, or they could be losses resulting from deposition . Different building materials and environmental conditions can create different selective pressures for microorganisms if varied over wide ranges, which can result in differential survival and persistence rates. However, much of the previous work investigating the impact of environmental conditions on microorganism survival has focused on infectious organisms. For the vast majority of building operating conditions, more recent evidence suggests that the majority of bacteria and fungi found on surfaces are not actually growing in what are mostly inhospitable environments. However, it is likely that many of the microbes identified in areas of the home with periodic water exposure are alive; of course many cleaning events also introduce water, but they also introduce chemicals that are designed to remove or reduce microbes. Surprisingly, while studies have shown the impact of cleaning products on specific microbial groups such as fecal coliforms, no published studies have characterized how they impact diversity or community structure within buildings. Approaches for studying the active portion of microbial assemblages while still culture independent are beginning to be applied to indoor environments, and future work is likely to inform the extent of microbial activity and persistence in the indoor environment. Importantly, while it is likely that most microbes deposited onto surfaces become inactive or die,drying rack for weed these microbes may remain possible sources of allergens.The effects of moisture problems on the growth of indoor microorganisms have long been examined due to associations between indoor dampness and ill health outcomes. Moisture is the limiting factor for microbial growth in the indoor environment, and fungi are more tolerant of low-moisture conditions than bacteria.

Aside from direct input of bulk-phase water, either intentionally or unintentionally, levels of adsorbed water may be sufficient to support growth. For instance, growth has been observed on wood at an air relative humidity of 78%, on gypsum board at 86%, and in floor dust at 80%. While water availability is generally thought to be the limiting growth factor, critical surface moisture levels are challenging to define. Growth can occur directly on a wide range of building materials, such as insulation, concrete, paper, paints, and glues, and some building materials may come pre-contaminated with degrading fungi. Interestingly, while high relative humidity can support microbial growth, experiments indicate that spore release for some fungi can be higher under lower relative humidity. Often saprophytic fungi that are also abundant as aerosols are commonly found on damp building materials. The most common genera in moisture-damaged buildings include Aspergillus, Penicillium, Cladosporium, Eurotium, and Chaetomium, among others. Historically, most research has relied on culture-dependent, microscopic, and biochemical assays of microbial presence in buildings, while new DNA sequence-based approaches are beginning to be applied . Regardless of the methodological tool, there are analytical issues that persist independent of the specific approach when studying aerosols, namely identifying an indoor source of microbial contamination rather than simply detecting the presence of a microbe indoors. For aerosols, two approaches have typically been taken. In one approach, the microbial composition of aerosols in moldy homes is compared to dry homes; in another, indoor and outdoor concentrations of taxa are compared. The two approaches have also been used simultaneously.The former formed the basis for the Environmental Relative Moldiness Index , which sought to identify fungal species that may be informative for determining the mold-burden of a building. For building materials, the taxonomic identification of growing organisms, versus merely present, relies on direct culture and microscopic examinations of tape lifts. While it is expected that unintended water intrusion would lead to greater microbial growth and detectable microbial biomass when compared to “dry” homes, this pattern is not generalizable. In some studies of floor dust, an increase in moisture in the building is associated with an increase in fungal richness , while other studies conducted at the site of fungal growth have demonstrated dominance of a small number of species with increased moisture, and thus an apparent decrease in richness.

Therefore, the increased overall richness seen in homes with increased moisture may be due to contributions from growth at multiple locations. For composition , it might be predicted that moldy homes would have a distinct microbial makeup, as they would support the growth and persistence of certain taxa that would not thrive in a dry home. A recent study of the 2013 flood in Boulder, Colorado demonstrated the lasting effects of moisture in a home. After remediation had been completed, previously flooded homes still retained different microbial communities when compared to non-flooded controls. In particular, fungal concentrations were three times higher in flooded compared to non-flooded homes, and flooded homes had higher concentrations of Penicillium, Pseudomonadaceae, and Enterobacteriaceae.Indoor chemistry may be affected when fungi, bacteria, and other microbes produce chemical metabolites, especially on wetted building materials. Microbial volatile organic compounds have been isolated by measuring emissions from microbecolonized materials, often in laboratory chambers. Common indoor MVOCs are summarized in Table 2. Frequently observed chemical classes include alcohols, carbonyls, furans, terpenes and terpene alcohols, and sulfides. Semivolatile toxins are also produced by mold growing on building materials.However, the actual impact of microbes on indoor chemistry may be weak, since MVOCs may only be slightly elevated even in moldy versus non-moldy spaces, if at all, and the concentrations may not be that high compared to other VOCs typically present indoors. Also, MVOCs from microbial emissions are difficult to isolate, because no MVOCs are exclusively emitted from any particular species or genera, or even from microbes only. That said, the prevalence of sick building syndrome symptoms have been previously associated with MVOCs, including 1-octen-3-ol, 2-pentanol, 2-hexanone, 2-pentylfuran, and formaldehyde . Beyond the microbial influence on indoor chemistry, chemical compounds and physicochemical states could also influence the indoor micro-biome. Microbes growing on building materials may be influenced by adsorbed water or organic films, as well as compounds from the nearby air.

Though little is known about how these variables impact microbial communities, certain inferences may be drawn. Adsorbed water may be a few monolayers thick, and more than that if the surface is wetted. Most microbes prefer neutral pH ranges, and Corsi et al. proposed that changes in the concentration of carbon dioxide, ammonia, or other compounds indoors might lead to pH changes in these surface water films in such a way as to influence microbial growth or diversity. Though organic surface films may resemble each other among surface types across different indoor spaces, some films could become more toxic over time due to absorption of harmful semivolatiles, such as pesticides. Furthermore,vertical cannabis airborne chemicals could influence microbes. Russell et al. demonstrated that bacteria on roots of plants, and this effect could conceivably occur with microbes in indoor environments. Microbes might also be inactivated by direct oxidation from hydroxyl radical or ozone on surfaces. Finally, a related focus of indoor micro-biome research and chemical interactions has been on whether different building materials harbor microbial communities of differing composition. Studies with wetted materials do indicate some differences in the microbial composition and metabolite production based on growth substrate. For example, wooden materials show greater fungal diversity than plasterboard or ceramics , and cellulose based materials are more sensitive to contamination by fungal growth than inorganic materials such as gypsum, mortar, and concrete. However, field studies in non-wetted buildings have challenged the viewpoint that substrate composition drives microbial community structure by showing that source strength dominates instead, e.g. Refs.. Most recently, a study in offices assessed the impacts of geography, material type, location in a room, seasonal variation, and indoor and micro-environmental parameters on bacterial communities of standardized surface materials. Bacterial communities did not depend on the surface material itself, but they did depend on geography and location in the room. Specifically, floor samples of all surface materials showed richer microbial assemblages than other locations within the rooms, a finding also observed in a recent study of public restrooms.Many previous studies of the indoor micro-biome relied on culture-based methods, microscopic identification, or biochemical assays, such as measuring ergosterol or ATP. More recently, the use of high-throughput DNA sequencing has allowed for a more thorough characterization of microbial communities. Analysis can involve targeted sequencing of specific genes, sometimes called amplicon sequencing or “barcoding” because it uses a common region to identify the microbes present, or metagenomics, which aims to sequence randomly from all of the genetic material found in a given environmental sample. Sequence-based approaches offer several advances over culture- or microscopy-based techniques in identifying microbes in buildings. In addition to the increased efficiency by which microbes can be detected compared to these previous methods, DNA-based detection often facilitates the refined identification of species. Moreover, culture-based analysis may not detect organisms in a “viable but not culturable” state. On the other hand, sequence-based approaches cannot differentiate the DNA of viable and non-viable organisms or other fragments. A complementary approach would be to combine existing biochemical assays with emerging DNA based approaches to provide a fuller view of microbial activity and diversity. Ironically, the detection of many additional species can result in greater analytical challenges, increasing the difficulty of separating out the “signal” from the “noise.” The vast amount of data generated with high-throughput sequencing can require the use of additional statistical tools such as methods to control for many comparisons in an analysis, and these may be borrowed from other genetic methods.

The same sample is not typically analyzed by different methods , often because of logistical issues surrounding the processing, but studies that have used a combination of approaches have shown that they offer different but complementary views of the indoor micro-biome. Quantitative Polymerase Chain Reaction provides quantitative information on the abundance of a specific taxonomic group of interest. The use of qPCR with universal fungal or bacterial primers can provide a general estimate of total bacterial genomes or fungal spore equivalents in a sample, although these determinations of biomass based on universal primers are estimates of concentration due to differences in gene copy number and amplification bias across different species. Despite potential biases, qPCR analyses may be done in conjunction with DNA sequencing to improve understanding of microbial exposure and to yield quantitative estimates of the concentrations of individual species. Using these new techniques, the most significant contribution to the literature has arguably been the acknowledgement of the sheer diversity of microorganisms in buildings. Often, hundreds to thousands of OTUs are identified by any given study . Since it remains unclear whether overall microbial diversity itself or individual microbial groups are more important to human and building health, current techniques that better capture overall microbial diversity may be positioned to answer long-standing questions in the field. Moreover, there are opportunities for further expansion to broader taxonomic groups, including viruses, and to analyze different targets, such the RNA transcripts and proteins to more fully characterize microbial gene expression and proteins of interest in the indoor environment.Perhaps the most practical question while investigating the micro-biome of buildings is the choice of sampling methodology. It would be ideal if common practices were used to facilitate understanding and comparison across studies. There are many biological sampling methods available, each with distinct advantages and disadvantages. Most require sample collection followed by offline analysis, although several newer on-line techniques are also available. While there is at present no “gold standard” method that meets all requirements for sampling and subsequent analysis for all purposes , below we summarize many commonly used methods for biological sampling in indoor environments and discuss considerations on spatial and temporal resolution.Moistened sterile swabs are widely used for biological sampling directly from surfaces, although it can be difficult to obtain adequate biomass from some locations. Settled dust samples are also collected using wipes or vacuum filter devices, as they represent an integrated record of microbial communities in a space. It is important to consider the size cutoff of the filter for vacuum collection, since larger particles may dominate the composition analysis but are not likely to contribute significantly to indoor exposure due to rapid settling after resuspension. More traditional approaches include tape lifts and contact plates for microscopy and culturing.

Half of the study homes were randomly selected to receive the chimney stove

While Northern California receives considerable seasonal rainfall, there is also significant spatial variability in rainfall totals and in corresponding summer flow persistence of small streams . Considering the ephemeral nature of surface water in many areas , the increasing frequency of drought due to climate change and cannabis cultivation’s consistent demand for irrigation water as crops near harvest , cultivators are strongly motivated to secure reliable water sources for the entirety of the growing season. Therefore, it is likely that water extraction from wells is a common practice for cultivators, beyond those seeking participation in the regulated industry . Although cannabis regulations place no explicit restrictions on where water is sourced, those currently within or seeking to join the regulated cannabis industry will be subject to a restriction on diversions of spring and surface water during the growing season . This requirement is already in place for permits issued by the California Department of Fish and Wildlife and will also be enforced by the State Water Resources Control Board beginning in 2019. The data provided in this study indicates that, in order to meet the forbearance period requirement, cultivators may be more inclined to drill a well to achieve compliance than to develop water storage for spring and surface water. Determining cultivators’ capability to store the water they need for the growing season may shed further light on the likelihood that growers will seek subsurface water. If compliance necessitates drilling a well,growers solution it will be important to account for the impacts of this potential shift in cultivation practices. Successful protection of freshwater resources in Northern California will require a more complete accounting of where cannabis cultivators source their water and the amount and timing of water extracted.

Study of cannabis as an agricultural crop has been notoriously inadequate, but data provided by the water quality control board’s cannabis program offers critical new insights into the water use practices of cultivators entering the regulated industry. In this initial analysis, we found that subsurface water may be much more commonly used in cannabis cultivation than previously supposed. Further analyses of cannabis cultivation’s water extraction demand, as well as of geospatial variation in water demand, may help elaborate the ramifications of this finding. Ultimately, a better understanding of cannabis cultivation’s water demand will be useful for placing the cannabis industry in the greater context of all water allocation needs in the North Coast and throughout California.Low-birth-weight infants are at high risk for morbidity and mortality in infancy and childhood as well as chronic diseases in adulthood . More than 95% of LBW infants are born in low-income countries . In 2002, the World Health Organization estimated that 12% of infants born in Guatemala were LBW [Pan American Health Organization 2007], although this is likely to be an underestimation of national rates, because those most likely to be LBW and least likely to be weighed at birth are rural, poor, indigenous children born at home. Solid fuels, including coal, wood, crop residues, and animal dung, are used by about half the world’s population and by 90% of people residing in rural areas of low-income countries . Traditional cooking stoves are typically inefficient at combusting solid fuel and often lead to high exposures to particulate matter and carbon monoxide . In Guatemala, where 83% of the rural households use wood for cooking fuel , 24-hr kitchen concentrations of PM2.5 from wood fires can range from 100 μg/m3 in homes using chimney stoves in good condition to 1,000 μg/m3 in homes using open fires. These concentrations are orders of magnitude higher than those in homes where tobacco cigarettes are smoked, where daily mean concentrations of PM2.5 vary between 25 and 40 μg/m3 . Mean concentrations of CO over a 24-hr period are also high and often exceed the health-based WHO guidelines of 9 ppm .

Depending on source strength, ventilation, and other factors that mediate or magnify exposure, wood fires typically yield levels of exposure to PM and CO that are much higher than environmental tobacco smoke . ETS has been linked to mean birth weight reductions of 33 g [95% confidence interval , 16–51 g] and to a 22% increase in the prevalence of LBW infants . Associations between maternal exposures to household air pollution and LBW have been described in children in Guatemala , Zimbabwe , Pakistan , and India . In previous studies, all exposures to solid fuel smoke were estimated from self-report of fuel and stove type used. Thus, the level of exposures to specific household air pollutants is not known. The purpose of this study was to determine the impact of reduced HAP from an introduced chimney stove on the prevalence of LBW infants in rural Guatemala. We assessed exposure with personal measures of CO during pregnancy. For this study, we conducted a post hoc analysis to examine the birth weight of Guatemalan infants whose mothers participated in the RESPIRE trial. The primary aim of RESPIRE was to examine the incidence of acute lower respiratory infection among children < 18 months of age in households randomized to receive a wood-fueled chimney-stove intervention compared with control families who continued to use traditional open fires .Between October 2002 and December 2004, the RESPIRE trial was conducted among 534 households in 23 rural Guatemalan communities. Most participants were members of the Mam-Mayan linguistic group. Households were recruited if they used open wood fires for cooking and had either a pregnant women or a child < 4 months of age.The other half of the homes continued to use an open fire until their child reached 18 months, or until the study ended, at which time the family was offered a chimney stove.

A total of 266 of the 534 women were enrolled during pregnancy, with the remaining children recruited at < 4 months of age. After enrollment, pregnant women received a baseline pregnancy examination by a physician employed by the study, which included a medical history, urine analysis, blood pressure measurement, and estimate of fetal growth . Fieldworkers visited women weekly in their homes, and women were referred to physicians if the women reported pregnancy complications. Among the enrolled pregnant women, 254 women delivered singleton, live births . Twelve additional births occurred among these women during the study period. Figure 1 summarizes characteristics of pregnant women and births. Among the 254 women, 240 participated in an ancillary study of adult women’s lung function. In this study, height and non-pregnant weight were measured . Height was measured using a seca portable stadiometer . Weight was measured using a Taylor Precision Tech Lithium electronic scale . Once RESPIRE staff were notified of a birth, either by a fieldworker at the weekly home visit or by a family member who contacted project staff, the project manager attempted to visit the home to weigh the newborn within 48 hr. Sometimes practical issues made it difficult to reach the home to carry out measurement, such as delayed notification by family members,growers equipment minimally skilled birth attendants who did not routinely weigh newborns, and communities located several hours away from the project office. Thus, of the 254 newborns, 208 birth weights were measured within 1 week, including 174 measured within the first 48 hr. Because newborns can lose up to 5–10% of their birth weight in the first week, we restricted our birth weight analysis to the 174 newborns measured within 48 hr of birth. Birth weight was measured in grams using a calibrated Siltec BS1 baby scale with 10-g readability . Infants wore a light shirt provided by project staff to standardize clothing weight. Gestational age was not assessed. Intention-to-treat analysis assumes that those who were randomized to receive the intervention stove had lower exposure to HAP than did those in the control group who continued to use open fires. However, because the RESPIRE trial was designed to monitor infant respiratory illness, many of the pregnant women were recruited in the later stages of pregnancy. They received the stove, which required a 5-week drying period after construction, shortly before, or even a few days after, delivery. Therefore, birth weight outcome analyses were based on actual stove type in use during the pregnancy during the observation period and not based on randomization, resulting in 69 births to women who used a chimney stove during pregnancy and 105 births to women who used an open fire during pregnancy .

Personal exposure to CO was used as an indicator of exposure to HAP and as a proxy for PM exposures . Passive-diffusion colorimetric CO tubes were used, with high-range tubes for baseline period measurements before stove construction, and low-range tubes for observation period measurements. Methods for deploying, validating, and analyzing the CO tubes have been described previously . Pregnant women wore CO tubes for a 48-hr period, with a total of 378 CO tubes worn during 247 pregnancies. Baseline measurements were made before stove construction when all houses were using open fires. During this period, women wore 278 CO tubes during their pregnancy, with 4% of women in the first, 33% in the second, and 63% in the third trimester. During the observation period, CO measurements were made at 3- to 6-month intervals. Pregnant women wore 100 CO tubes during this period, with 6% of women in the first, 14% in the second, and 80% in the third trimesters. If a woman had more than one measurement taken during either the baseline or the observation period, an average of the measures was provided for that period. However, with so few measures available for pregnant women in the first two trimesters with the stove in use, we did not have enough information to incorporate these data into the multivariate birth weight models. Instead, the independent variable is actual stove type used during pregnancy. Statistical methods. We used Stata version 11 for data analyses. Because CO tube data had a right-skewed distribution, both arithmetic and geometric means and respective standard deviations are reported and log-transformed data were used to test for differences between groups. We compared stove groups and birth weight outcomes with Student’s t-test for continuous variables, and chi-square tests of significance for categorical variables. We constructed multivariate linear models of birth weight as a continuous outcome among exposed and unexposed women, based on the stove type that was used during the pregnancy. Covariates were included in the multivariate linear regression if a) there was evidence of a relationship with either outcome or HAP exposure in the literature, or b) there was an observed statistical association with either outcome or exposure using appropriate parametric or non-parametric hypothesis tests. To investigate potential seasonal effects of HAP on birth weight , we examined season of birth in the multivariate model. The three seasons in this region of Guatemala are cold season , warm, dry season , and warm, rainy season . We also examined the effect of season during the three trimesters of fetal growth; interaction terms for season × trimester of stove introduction were included in the regression models. Variables in the model were assessed for multi-collinearity using a variance inflation factor and were removed if VIF > 10. Outliers were classified using studentized residuals ± 3.0, and a model without outliers was compared with a model that included the “outlier” observations. Leverage plots and partial regression plots were examined to assess any influence individual observations might have on model coefficients. Predicted residuals were plotted against a normal distribution and against the fitted values, to assess for functional form and constant variance. We used the likelihood-ratio test statistic to compare restricted versus full models to determine which model best described the data. We clustered multiple observations on the same woman to derive standard error estimates that would be robust to nonindependent observations. In the final multivariate model, two outlier observations were excluded because they were found to sufficiently influence the homogeneity of the residuals of the data. An adjusted odds ratio for presence of LBW among open-fire users, compared with chimney-stove users , was calculated using logistic regression, and CIs were estimated using robust error estimates. p-Values < 0.05 were considered significant.